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CONTRACT LAW NOW-REALITY MEETS LEGAL
FICTIONS
Danielle Kie Hart*

Modern contract law is designed to achieve a fundamental
objective, namely, to ensure that voluntary agreements between
private parties are legally binding. The appropriateness of this
objective and the assumptions underlying it are rarely questioned.
Legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike presuppose that
the binding nature of contracts is a desirable and positive feature of
our legal system. But are the assumptions underlying the modern
contract system sound? Do people behave in the way that contract
law supposes? And are the concepts of voluntary, informed consent
and freedom from state interference really the hallmarks of the
modern contract system? This article explores and seeks to answer
these questions. In so doing, it reveals an overlooked gap between
theory and practice that calls into doubt the notion that contract law
has anything to do with freedom and voluntary consent.
Drawing on leading social science literature, this article seeks to
make two contributions. First, the article shows that the assumptions
underlying the modern contract law framework are flawed both
theoretically and practically. Many contracts are not entered into
voluntarily by rational actors, and the state regularly interferes.
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Imbalances of power, not freedom and consent, form the
cornerstones of the modern system of contract law. Second, the
article attempts to reveal the way contract law promotes and
privileges these power imbalances. While the positions staked out in
this article are admittedly foreign to conventional contract law
theory, they are far from radical. Instead, they flow naturally from
well-accepted social science insights, including the work of Legal
Realists, Critical Legal Studies scholars, relational contract
theorists, and, more recently, the field of behavioral law and
economics. What is striking is not that the positions advanced here
depart from conventional belief, but that the lessons from leading
social science research have had, to date, so little impact on contract
doctrine. This article seeks to change that.
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INTRODUCTION
Modem contract law is crafted to achieve a fundamental
objective-to ensure that voluntary agreements between private
parties are legally binding. 1 Several assumptions about how people
behave serve to justify this objective. Modem contract law assumes
that contractual obligations are private transactions, voluntarily
undertaken by informed, rational actors, in a market mostly free of
state interference. 2 Once a contract is properly formed, parties are
required to comply with the agreed-upon obligations. Compliance is
ensured through state power,3 even if in hindsight one party has made
a "bad bargain.,,4
The appropriateness of this objective (to create binding legal
obligations) and the assumptions underlying it are rarely questioned.
Legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike presuppose,
without serious analysis, that the binding nature of contracts is a
desirable and positive feature of our legal system. 5 Indeed, what
could be wrong in requiring parties to keep their promises? That the
law holds people to their promises is perceived as fair because
contract law purports to reduce unequal bargaining power and other
inequities to make agreements a product of voluntary, informed
consent. 6 But are the assumptions underlying the modem contract
system sound? Do people behave in the way that contract law
supposes? And are the concepts of voluntary, informed consent and
freedom from state interference really the hallmarks of the modem
contract system? This article explores and seeks to answer these
questions. In so doing, it reveals an overlooked gap between theory
and practice that calls into doubt the notion that contract law has
anything to do with freedom and voluntary consent.
Drawing on leading social science literature, this article seeks to
make two contributions. First, the article shows that the assumptions
underlying the modem contract law framework are flawed both
theoretically and practically. 7 Many contracts are not entered into
voluntarily by rational actors, and the state regularly interferes.
l.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. a, c, g (1981); see also infra Part
LA.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-65 (discussing the listed assumptions).
See infra Part ILA.
See infra text accompanying notes 331-32 (discussing bad bargains specifically).
See generally Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment ofPower,
41 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 175, 199-204 (2009); infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text
(discussing suggested, positive aspects of modern contract law).
See infra Part LA; Hart, supra note 5, at 175-82.
See infra Part ILA.
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Imbalances of power, not freedom and consent, form the cornerstones
of the modem system of contract law. 8 Second, the article attempts
to reveal the way contract law promotes and privileges these power
imbalances. 9 While present remedial mechanisms focused on
disclosure are commonly believed to mitigate power inequities, in
reality those mechanisms do the opposite. Instead, the article shows
that unequal bargaining power is effectively institutionalized in the
modern contract law system, and demonstrates how that system
surreptitiously promotes misuse and abuse of power. IO
In advancing these positions, the article breaks sharply from the
current literature. For example, while many contract-law scholars
extol the virtue of disclosure statutes as a way to address unequal
bargaining power, II the article argues that those disclosure
requirements are ineffective at best, and, at worst, exacerbate the
problem. 12
While the positions staked out in this article are admittedly foreign
to conventional contract law theory, they are far from radical.
Instead, they flow naturally from well-accepted social science
insights, including the work of Legal Realists, Critical Legal Studies
scholars, relational contract theorists, and, more recently, the field of
behavioral law and economics. 13 What is striking is not that the
positions advanced here depart from conventional belief, but that the
lessons from leading social science research have had, to date, so
little impact on contract doctrine. This article seeks to change that.
With this in mind, the article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, the
article focuses on how the modern contract law system 14 legitimizes
itself through the binding nature of agreements. The article also
explores the fundamental assumptions that underlie contract law and
the manner in which disclosure statutes embrace those underlying
In Part II, the article demonstrates how those
assumptions.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See irifra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See irifra Part III.B.
See infra text accompanying notes 111-14 (discussing purposes of disclosure
statutes).
See irifra Part III.B.
See infra Part II.A.
The terms "modem contract law system" and "modern contract law" are used
interchangeably throughout the article. In using either term, I am referring to the rules
of contract law, its animating norm(s), and the assumptions that underlie those rules.
See infra text accompanying notes 53--65 (discussing the underlying assumptions).
The context in the article should make it clear whether the rules, norm(s), or
assumptions are being discussed.
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assumptions are flawed, both in theory and in practice. In so doing,
Part II exposes the extent to which state power is ever present in the
modem contract law system. Finally, in Part III, the article shows
how unequal bargaining power is institutionalized and how power is
concealed within the modern contract law system to the detriment of
parties with less bargaining power. The article demonstrates how,
contrary to conventional wisdom, disclosure statutes frustrate, rather
than aid, in reducing the negative effects of bargaining power
inequities. Part III also reveals how modem contract law gives
license to parties with more bargaining power, if they so choose,15 to
impose "bad bargains" on other contracting partners with impunity.
The article concludes on a provocative note. Once the inequities
girding the modem contract law system are unmasked, they suggest
that we cannot continue to ignore them, but instead must more
meaningfully discuss what, if anything, can or should be done.
A final point before proceeding: The questions raised and legal
doctrines critiqued in this article are not simply matters of highminded theory-they have pragmatic and real life implications. The
recent subprime-mortgage debacle is illustrative of how the modem
contract law system enforces "bad bargains" and where bargaining
power inequities lead to bad results. To concretely illustrate the
arguments made, this article will rely on the following hypothetical
involving a subprime home mortgage loan,16 one in which disclosure
statutes are implicated. The specific statutes include the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA)17 and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA).18

15.

16.

17.

18.

Professor Daniel Bamhizer argues that the fact that "one side has great visible, real
power in the bargaining process may just as easily permit that party to make
concessions." Daniel D. Bamhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L.
REv. 139, 177 (2005) [hereinafter Barnhizer, Inequality]. While this is correct, the
significant thing to keep in mind is that it is still a choice whether to impose a bad
bargain or not and the only party with the capacity to exercise that choice is the party
with superior bargaining power.
An accepted definition of a "subprime loan" is one with an annual percentage rate
(APR) that is three or more points higher than the treasury rate for a security of the
same maturity. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1088 (2009).
IS U.S.C. §§ 1601-1615, 1631-1649, 1661, 1667(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2004)
(implemented by the Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1
(2005)).
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2617 (2006)
(implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R. pts.
3500, 3800 (2008)).
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The lender in the hypothetical is CitiMortgage. CitiMortgage was
chosen because it is a mortgage companyl9 and a subsidiary of
Citigroup, Inc./o it was also one of the biggest subprime mortgage
lenders in the country.21 The borrower is Mary Smith, a 32-year-old,
single, African-American woman. Research and studies show that
subprime loans were predominantly made to younger, single or
divorced women of color living in minority neighborhoods. 22
19.

20.
21.

22.

Mortgage companies, as opposed to depository institutions, like a bank, were
responsible for originating the bulk of subprime loans. Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at
1090.
This
information
was
taken
from
the
Citi
website:
CITI,
http://www.citigroup.comlciti/businessJbrands.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 20 II).
In 2006, CitiMortgage was the fifth top subprime lender, based on market share. See
IVY L. ZELMAN ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR:
UNDERESTIMATED
No MORE
22
exhibit
14
(2007),
available at
http://www.recharts.comlreports/CSHB031207/CSHB031207.html(listing the market
shares of the top subprime lenders in 2006 as follows: Wells Fargo 13.0%, HSBC
Finance S.3%, New Century S.I %, Countl)'Wide Financial 6.3%, CitiMortgage 5.9%,
WMC Mortgage 5.2%, Fremont Investment 5.0%, Ameriquest 4.6%, Option One
4.5%, First Franklin 4.3%, Washington Mutual 4.2%, Residential Funding 3.4%,
Aegis Mortgage 2.7%, American General 2.4%, Accredited Lenders 2.3%). The
report also noted that the top fifteen lenders captured SO.5% of the market. Jd.
See ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED'N OF AMERICA,
WOMEN ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN ARE
DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET 1-4, 6-11,
15
(2006),
available
at
http://www.consumerfed.orgipdfs/
WomenPrimeTargetsStudyl20606.pdf (finding that women, particularly AfricanAmerican and Latino women, were more likely to receive subprime mortgages than
men); CAPITAL AREA ASSET BUILDERS ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: A STUDY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, SECURITIES
AND
BANKING
1,
7,
10,
14-15
(200S),
available
at
http://www.trfund.comlresource/downloads/policypubs/Subprime_Lending_
Study_6_20_OS _ DC.pdf (finding that subprime loans were disproportionately made to
low income, African-American borrowers); CONSUMERS UNION SWRO, WOMEN IN
THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.consumersunion.
orgipdflwomen-sub.pdf(data from Texas); IRA GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE REINVESTMENT
FUND, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE FILINGS IN MARYLAND: A STUDY BY THE
REINVESTMENT FUND FOR THE BALTIMORE HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION
COALITION 6, 26, 34 (200S), available at http://www.trfund.comlresource
/downloads/policypubs/MarylandForeclosure.pdf (finding that African-Americans
living in predominantly African-American neighborhoods received a higher
percentage of sUbprime loans than other racial categories, and that most loans in
foreclosure were obtained for home purchases rather than refinances); Manny
Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities in Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,2007,
http;//www.nytimes.coml200711 0/15/nyregionlI5subprime.html?_ r= I (citing a study
conducted by New York University's Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban
Policy, which indicated that "[hlome buyers in predominantly black and Hispanic
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African-American women were disproportionately represented
among this demographic. 23
In 2006, CitiMortgage sold Ms. Smith a subprime loan to purchase
a single-family residence 24 in a predominantly minority neighborhood
in exchange for a mortgage on the house purchased. CitiMortgage
sold Ms. Smith this loan even though she did not actually qualify for
it. 25 Some of the terms included in the loan were a high prepayment
penalty provision/6 very high origination27 and post-origination

23.

24.
25.

26.

neighborhoods in New York City were more likely to get their mortgages last year
from a subprime lender than home buyers in white neighborhoods with similar income
levels").
FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 22, at I (finding that women, particularly AfricanAmerican and Latino women, were more likely to receive subprime mortgages than
men); accord CONSUMERS UNION SWRO, supra note 22, at 1-4 (data from Texas).
In 2006, "42.4 percent of first-lien subprime loans were purchase loans." Bar-Gill,
supra note 16, at 1089.
Qualifying for a loan is the process by which a person applies for a loan and the
lender determines the likelihood that the borrower will be able to repay the loan
according to its terms. Nathaniel R. Hull, Comment, Crossing the Line: Prime,
Subprime, and Predatory Lending, 61 ME. L. REV. 287, 288 (2009). Lenders
generally use several established criteria to determine whether a borrower qualifies for
a home mortgage loan: the borrower's credit score-usually a FICO score higher than
660; documentation of income, debt, employment, and assets (including financial
resources and other property or collateral); and "a loan amount less than the maximum
size loan that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are allowed to purchase." Jd. at 292 &
nn.33-34; see also Do You QualifY for a Mortgage Loan?, INCHARGE DEBT
SOLUTIONS, http://www .incharge.orglmoney -101 Ibuying-a-home/do-you-qualify-fora-mortgage-Ioan (last visited Nov. 26, 2011). If a borrower satisfies the criteria, she
qualifies for a prime mortgage, which is a mortgage at the best interest rate then
available. If she does not meet the criteria, then she generally only qualifies for a
subprime mortgage, which is a mortgage at a higher interest rate. Hull, supra at 292;
see also supra note 16 (defining subprime loan). To say that Mary Smith did not
qualify for the subprime mortgage loan she was sold by CitiMortgage, therefore,
means not only that she did not satisfy one or more of the lending criteria, but also
that she was unlikely to be able to repay the loan according to its terms.
A common feature of subprime loans was a steep prepayment penalty term. Estimates
suggest that between 64% and 98% of subprime loans included a prepayment penalty.
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 763 (2006); see also Bar-Gill, supra
note 16, at 1101 (putting the number at 70%). Significantly, the steep prepayment
penalty provisions made it prohibitively expensive for many borrowers to refinance
out of their original loans at all, let alone prior to the upward adjustment of their
adjustable rate mortgages. See CAPITAL AREA ASSET BUILDERS ET AL., supra note 22,
at 2; cf Catherine M. Brennan, Unintended Consequences: Investor Fallout from the
Mortgage Crisis, 28 No. 12 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'y REP. I (Dec. 2009);
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1102 ("Prepayment penalties make it more difficult for
borrowers to evade the escalating payments."). To put prepayment penalties into
some perspective, Bar-Gill writes:
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fees,28 which totaled 20% of the loan amount/9 and a 2/28 adjustablerate mortgage (ARM).30 CitiMortgage properly disclosed to Ms.
Smith all of the information required by TILA and RESPA, the
relevant consumer protection statutes.
CitiMortgage did not,
however, disclose to Ms. Smith that she did not qualify for the loan.
Two years later, Ms. Smith defaulted on her loan.
I.

BINDING CONTRACTS

The starting point of the analysis is the way in which the modem
contract law system legitimizes itself through the binding nature of
agreements. "Binding" means two different but related things 31 first, "binding" means that the contract is valid as between the parties
(because it satisfies contract law's formation requirements), and
second, it means that the rights and obligations set forth in that
contract will be enforced by the state on behalf of one of the parties

27.

28.
29.

30.

31.

The penalty amount is usually expressed as a percentage of the
outstanding balance on the loan, up to 5 percent, or as the sum of
a specified number of months, commonly six months, worth of
interest payments. This is a significant amount. For example, a 3
percent penalty on a $200,000 balance amounts to $6,000.
Id. at 1101 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1077 ("[O]rigination fees [include] a credit check fee, an appraisal fee, a flood
certification fee, a tax certification fee, an escrow analysis fee, an underwriting
analysis fee, a document preparation fee and separate fees for sending emails, faxes
and courier mail .... "); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39 (2008) ("The Wall Street Journal points to one possibility:
mortgage brokers received 27% higher fees for originating subprime mortgages than
for originating conforming loans.").
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1077 (,,[P]ost-origination fees [include] late fees,
foreclosure fees, ... and dispute-resolution or arbitration fees.").
Id. ("[Origination and post-origination] fees can add up to thousands of dollars, or up
to 20 percent of the loan amount."). According to Professor Lauren Willis, "[w]hen
financed into the loan, origination fees and ancillary products form the basis for
additional interest charges over the life of the loan." Willis, supra note 26, at 725.
A 2/28 adjustable rate mortgage is one that has a fixed interest rate for the first two
years of the loan and then an adjustable interest rate for the remaining twenty-eight
years of the loan. Mortgage Reference Library: 2128 Adjustable Rate Mortgage,
BROKER OUTPOST, http://www.brokeroutpost.comlreference/27353.htrn (last visited
Nov. 26, 2011); see also Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1098 ("According to the FRB,
approximately three-fourths of originations in securitized subprime 'pools' from 2003
to 2007 were ARMs or hybrids with two- or three-year 'teaser' rates followed by
substantial increases in the rate and payment (so-called '2-28' and '3-27'
mortgages). ").
See infra Part II.A. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 204-16 (articulating in detail
both aspects of "being bound" to a contract).

10

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 41

over the objection of the other, now "resisting party.,,32 Modem
contract law relies on several fundamental assumptions to justify
binding people to their contracts and the modem system's reliance on
disclosure statutes. If these assumptions are correct, then it is
perfectly acceptable to make contracts binding33 and to rely on
disclosure statutes as a remedial mechanism.
A.

The Modern Contract Law System

Contract law allegedly shifted in the 1930s 34 from the classical to
the modem system. 35 Modem contract law is different from classical
32.

33.

34.

35.

This latter statement in the text is true because, in reality, contract law is primarily
concerned with holding a "resisting party," that is, a party that no longer wants to be
bound by the contract, to the contract. If both parties were performing and had no
objections to the other's performance, there would be no legal problem for contract
law to be concerned with. Conversely, if both parties decided they wanted to walk
away from the contract, there is again no legal problem presented, because neither
party would be complaining about the other's performance or lack thereof. Hence,
contract law is especially concerned with enforcing a contract against one of the
parties, specifically, the party who no longer wants to be bound by it. See William
Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 975, 987 n.14 (1982) ("Enforcement of contracts does not
merely ratify the results of individual will; it chooses whose will to enforce by
overriding the will of the one who breached the contract."); Morris R. Cohen, The
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,562 (1933) [hereinafter Cohen, Contract]
("[I]n enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two individuals to
do what they have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement, in fact, puts the
machinery of the law in the service of one party against the other. ").
Even the party seeking enforcement would need to be "bound" to the contract,
through formation and enforcement, to assert its claims under it. Therefore, contracts
must be binding on both parties.
This version of the evolution of contract law is not without its critics. See, e.g., Roy
KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 7 (2007) (commenting that the tendency to read the history of
contract law as an evolutionary process in which "contract was always about
individuals creating their own obligations" is "ahistorical and thus in some sense a
distortion"); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3--4 (1974).
The classical legal period lasted roughly seventy years, from 1860 to the 1930s. See
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xi (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
LEGAL REALISM]; Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the
Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REv. I, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Feinman, Un-Making]
(noting that classical legal thought was dominant from 1870 to 1920); Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 478 (1988) [hereinafter Singer,
Realism] (setting the time period of classical legal thought as 1860-1940). But see
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 23,28 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
Mensch, History] (setting the time period as 1885-1935). The shift to modern
contract law lasted approximately sixty years, from the 1930s through the
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contract law in many ways. For example, modem contract law relies
on standards rather than rigid, technical rules; 36 makes the context in
which a contract was formed matter in a couple of important
respects;37 and gives expanded recognition to several "contract
policing,,3& doctrines 39 and to reliance and restitution as alternatives to
a traditional contract. 40
Unlike classical contract, modern contract law also acknowledges
that markets are not perfect41 and, in fact, contain imperfections,
primarily in the form of information asymmetries and bargaining

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

1990s. Feinman, Un-Making, supra at 11-14; Ralph James Mooney, The New
Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REv. 113 I, 1133 (1995) [hereinafter
Mooney, New Conceptualism].
E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to Standards, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 634, 634 (1982) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Prefatory Remarb]; Jay
M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1287
(1990) [hereinafter Feinman, Theory]; Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't Revoke,
2004 WIS. L. REv. 309,318 (2004) [hereinafter Knapp, Offer]; Richard E. Speidel,
Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 260 (1995)
[hereinafter Speidel, Domain].
Knapp, Offer, supra note 36, at 317; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence
of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1749, 1756-60 (2000) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Dynamic] (providing interpretation for the agreed-to contract terms);
Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1287 (supplying additional terms); Speidel,
Domain, supra note 36, at 260-61 (supplying additional terms).
"Contract policing" doctrines are doctrines used by courts to police contracts against,
among other things, unfairness or bargaining misbehavior in the formation process
and inequality in the resulting exchange. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS §§ 4.1, 4.9 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the policing of contractual
agreements).
Specifically, modem contract law gives expanded recognition to llnconscionability,
dllress in the form of economic duress, and misrepresentation. See Hart, supra note 5,
at 178 n.7. The traditional contract policing doctrines inclllde minority, mental
incapacity, duress, undue influence, and fraud. Id. Modem contract law continues to
recognize them as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14
(minority), 15 (mental illness or defect), 175 (duress), 177 (undue influence) (1981).
Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1288; Robert Hillman, The Crisis in Modern
Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REv. 103, 103-04 (1988) [hereinafter Hillman, Crisis];
Knapp, Offer, supra note 36, at 318; Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin
Luther King. Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REv.
63,97 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, MLKj; Speidel, Domain, supra note 36, at 260-61.
A traditional contract is one formed by mutual assent and consideration. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741,
750 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bargain] ("[M]any contracts are made in markets
that are highly imperfect.").
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inequalities. 42 Modem contract law assumes, however, that such
problems are correctable with discrete and relatively easy-toimplement solutions. 43
Many of the changes implemented by modem contract law were
an attempt to give effect to norms of fairness and cooperation as
supplements to,44 but not replacements of, the classical norms of
individual autonomy and liberty.45 All of these changes remain in
place today, despite the alleged shift from modem contract to neoclassical contract law in the 1990s.46 For internal consistency and to
avoid confusion in nomenclature, however, the article will refer to the
contract law system that is being critiqued as "modem" contract law.
While there are clearly differences between classical and modem
contract law, the two systems are fundamentally the same. This is
true because modem contract law continues to adhere to most of the

42.

43.
44.

45.

46.

Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 96 ("Anomalies of the marketplace included
opportunism, the lack of perfect information, and bargaining inequity.") (internal
citations omitted); cf Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 583 (1982) (recognizing the development of
the decision maker to undertake a careful analysis in terms of the distributive
objective and its consistency with freedom of contract); Mensch, History, supra note
35, at 47 (discussing the view that courts should assign rights where they are most
valuable, mimicking the real-world, imperfect market).
See infra Part LB (discussing disclosure statutes).
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv.
1107, 1111-12 (1984) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Responsive]; Feinman, Theory, supra
note 36, at 1287-88; Knapp, Offer, supra note 36, at 318; Blake D. Morant, The
Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 889,902-03 (1997) [hereinafter Morant, Race].
Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 497,497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) ("The principle of
personal autonomy underlying freedom of contract has been supplemented by modem
principles of cooperation and fairness .... "); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 97
("While clinging to the notion of contractual freedom and bargaining autonomy,
neoclassicists appreciated some of the realities of bargaining differences.").
See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 773 (2002) [hereinafter, Knapp, Private]; Mooney,
New Conceptualism, supra note 35, at 1133-34. In fact, the claims made in this
article are probably more compelling as applied to neo-classical contract law, given
that this system resurrects much of the classical formalism rejected by modem
contract. See Feinman, Un-Making, supra note 35, at 16 ("Under the classical revival,
formality reigns at two levels. First, the contract doctrine itself becomes more formal;
ostensibly clear, rigid rules are favored over flexible standards. Second, the substance
of the rules favors formality in contracting practices."). But see KREITNER, supra note
34, at 7 (acknowledging that this version of contract history is contested).

2011]

Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions

13

classical system's underlying assumptions, and it left the core of
classical contract law, which is formation, completely intact.
To begin with, the modem contract law system,47 like the classical
system, still presupposes that an individual acts rationally48 in a
largely unregulated market. 49 Moreover, individual liability is still
premised on voluntary agreement. 50 Modem contract law also retains
the public-private distinction5l upon which much of classical legal
thought was based. 52 As a result, the paradigm transaction under
modem contract law, as under classical contract law, is the private
law transaction,53 one that is framed by all of the following wellestablished54 classical and now modem assumptions: 55

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1310.
See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737,
739-40, 743 (2000) [hereinafter Feinman, Relational].
See Jay M. Feinman, Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 287, 293 (2005) [hereinafter
Feinman, Book Review].
See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1287.
Classical legal thought was structured around several dichotomies, the most important
of which was the public-private distinction. See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at
1286. Within the private law sphere of the public-private dichotomy, individuals
exercised rights and were free to agree on whatever contract terms they wanted. See
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 403 (1979); Singer,
Realism, supra note 35, at 478-79. The state ostensibly played no role in regulating
the substantive terms of these private relations. See LEGAL REALISM, supra note 35, at
99; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 479. In the public sphere of government
regulation, public officials exercised state power, and all state-imposed obligations,
like quasi-contracts, torts, and real property, were relegated to this sphere. See Singer,
Realism, supra note 35, at 478, 480-81.
Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 39 ("[M]odem American legal thought continues
to be premised on the distinction between private law and public law. Private law is
still assumed to be about private actors with private rights, making private
choices .... ").
Jay M. Feinman, Contract After the Fall, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1537, 1538 (1987)
(reviewing HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (\986)) [hereinafter Feinman,
Fall]; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 39, 41.
See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New
Formalism, 75 Mo. L. REV. 493, 495-96 (2010) ("It is, therefore, now an accepted
tenet of contract law that '[f]reedom of contract prevails in an arm's-length
transaction between sophisticated parties ... and in the absence of countervailing
public policy concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their
bargain. "') (alteration in original) (quoting Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 1995)).
All ofthe assumptions listed in the text were adopted by the classical legal system and
retained by modem contract law. See Hart, supra note 5, at 189, 195-98.
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(1) A contract is a private transaction between private
parties. 56
(2) Parties bargain at arm's length, meaning they are most
likely strangers to one another. 57
(3) Individuals are rational actors in the marketplace. 58
(4) Contracts result from voluntary and informed choice. 59

56.

57.

58.

59.

ATlYAH, supra note 51, at 408 ("The autonomy of the free choice of private parties to
make their own contracts on their own terms was the central feature of classical
contract law."); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization ofRational Choice in Contract Law, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1261 (1998) ("Conventional contract logic views contract law as
a realm of purely private ordering in which individuals are free to choose the structure
of their relationships without interference. In this view, law does not judge the
formation, performance, or breach of a contract on the basis of external juristic values;
law acts only as a surrogate for the values created by the parties themselves."); see
also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1014 (1985) ("[O]ur principal vision of contract law is still one of a neutral
facilitator of private volition. We understand that contract law is concerned at the
periphery with the imposition of social duties. . .. But we conceive the central arena
to be an unproblematic enforcement of obligations voluntarily undertaken. . . .
Although we concede that the law of contract is the result of public decisions about
what agreements to enforce, we insist that the overarching public decision is to respect
and enforce private intention.").
See AT1Y AH, supra note 51, at 402--03 ("The model of contract theory which
implicitly underlay the classical law of contract ... was thus the model of the market.
Essentially this model is based on the following principal features. First, the parties
deal with each other 'at arm's length' ... ; this carries the notion that each relies on
his own skill and judgment, and that neither owes any fiduciary obligation to the
other."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 805, 808 (2000) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Relational] ("[C]lassical contract
law was implicitly based on a paradigm of bargains made between strangers
transacting in a perfect market.").
Eisenberg, Relational, supra note 57, at 808 ("[C]lassical contract law was based on a
rational-actor model of psychology, under which actors who make decisions in the
face of uncertainty rationally maximize their subjective expected utility, with all
future benefits and costs discounted to present value. In particular, the rules of
classical contract law were implicitly based on the assumptions that actors are fully
knowledgeable, know the law, and act rationally to further their economic selfinterest."); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV.
829, 832 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical] (individuals acted in their own selfinterest); see also ATIYAH, supra note 51, at 403.
Hadfield, supra note 56, at 1247 (1998) ("Contract law proceeds from the premise
that obligation is established by the existence of voluntary and informed choice to
enter into a contract. "); see also ATIY AH, supra note 51, at 403 ("[The fourth principle
of classical contract law is that] the deal is finally struck when the parties agree, or
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(5) Contract law is the law of the market. 60 Markets are
neutral and impartial, primarily self-regulating, and
largely outside of state control, but they do contain
imperfections in the form of information asymmetries
and bargaining inequalities. 61
Such imperfections,
however, can be fixed with minimal interference from
the state, thereby preserving the integrity of the
market. 62
(6) The state's role is neutral and minima1. 63
In addition, and significantly, modem and classical contract law
are fundamentally the same because modern contract law left the core

60.

61.

62.

63.

indicate their agreement. . .. The agreement must be made 'freely' and 'without
pressure' but these concepts are very narrowly interpreted, for they must not conflict
with the rule of the market place . . . ."); Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 479
(arguing that the "[c]lassical theorists considered three principles to be central to a
free contract systern[,l" one of which was the principle that a party could not be
forced to contract against her will).
See A TIY AH, supra note 51, at 402 ("The emphasis on contract law as the law of the
market was, in England at least, well established by 1870, although in America it may
have been a later development."); Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 477-82. See
generally AMy DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT 2, 13, 59 (1998)
(establishing that market theory of contract is a post-emancipation phenomenon);
Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 917,936-52 (1974).
Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 95 ("Anomalies of the marketplace included
opportunism, the lack of perfect information, and bargaining inequity.") (footnotes
omitted).
According to Jay Feinman, there is an "ideology of the market" still regnant in legal
education, politics, government, and social thought generally. He writes:
This ideology presents the market as the primary form of social
organization, as an empirical fact and a desirable state of affairs.
The market effectively enables individuals to achieve their life
projects while maximizing social welfare as a whole. It arises and
proceeds through a spontaneous order, obviating centralized
planning or significant government intervention. All of these
virtues require no more than modest correction at the margins, and
the job of the law is to maintain the conditions of the market,
notably through establishing ground rules of property and
contract, providing legal institutions and mechanisms to facilitate
market transactions, and maintaining social order.
Feinman, Book Review, supra note 49, at 293.
The Critique of the Public/Private Distinction, in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra
note 35, at 98,99; see also Dalton, supra note 56, at 1012-13; Singer, Realism, supra
note 35, at 479-80, 481.
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of classical contract law, which is fonnation, completely intact. 64
Mutual assent and consideration remain the only two elements
necessary to fonn a contract. 65 Indeed, modem contract law actually
strengthens the core (fonnation) because it makes it easier to fonn a
contract. 66 Specifically, modem contract law makes it particularly
easy to establish mutual assent,67 and the existence and adequacy of
consideration is seldom, if ever, questioned in a market-based
transaction. 68
Thus, modem contract law, like classical contract before it, creates
a "presumption of contract validity,,69 upon fonnation of a traditional
contract via mutual assent and consideration. 70 In other words, upon
fonnation, the law will presume that a valid contract exists. 71
Significantly, the presumption of contract validity is very difficult to
rebut under both the classical and modem systems, because of what I
have called elsewhere the "process problem.,,72 Briefly, the process
problem makes rebutting the presumption of contract validity
especially difficult because (1) the burden of proving that a contract
is unenforceable 73 for any reason is on the party challenging the
contract or defending against a breach of contract claim; 74 (2) all of
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.

See generally Hart, supra note 5, at Part III.B.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and a consideration."); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 93 ("A basic tenet of
traditional, classic contract theory requires that parties steadfastly obey the rules of
bargain formation in order to have binding agreements. Those whose agreements
manifest mutual assent and contain consideration may expect the enforcement of their
resultant agreements, barring some impediment.") (footnotes omitted).
See Hart, supra note 5, at Part IILB.3.
Id. at 202-10.
See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 38, § 2.2, at 48; Hart, supra note 5, at 205. In fact,
consideration is often irrelevant in a business context because contract law will find a
binding contract even in the absence of it. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (creating
an option contract without requiring consideration); U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (2003)
(making a modification under Article 2 binding without consideration); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (a), (c) (1981) (containing exceptions to the preexisting duty rule that validate modifications obtained without consideration).
See generally Hart, supra note 5, at Part IILB.4.
A traditional contract is one formed via mutual assent and consideration. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
Hart, supra note 5, at 206.
See id. at 210-15.
"Unenforceable," as used here, refers to anything that gets someone out of the
contract, whether by rescission, discharge of performance obligation, unenforceability
of the contract, etc.
Hart, supra note 5, at 207, 212-15; see also Stone v. Walsh, No. MMX085005292S,
2010 WL 4944629, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 19,2010) (noting that the burden of
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the other contract doctrines that someone challenging or defending
against the contract might use, including, but not limited to, contract
interpretation,75 the contract policing doctrines 76 and defenses to
performance,77 are literally outside the core-to use them one must
assume that an otherwise valid contract has been formed; 78 and (3)
practical realities, like the expense of litigation,19 the extensive use of

75.

proof for misrepresentation claim is on plaintiff who raised it and the burden of proof
for defense of waiver is on defendant); Olive v. McNeal, 47 So. 3d 735, 739-40
(Miss. Ct. App. 2010) ("The party seeking reformation of a deed on a mistake theory
bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."); Grice Eng' g, Inc. v.
Innovations Eng'g, Inc., No. 2009AP2757, 2010 WL 3768107, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2010) ("The burden of proving unconscionability is on the party alleging
unconscionability. ").
In contract interpretation, the contracting parties are now disputing what they meant
when they manifested their assent to the contract. The court is called upon to decide
which party's meaning prevails through the process of interpretation. 2 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 38, § 7.7. If the parties did not think they were bound by a contract and,
hence, subject to liability for failing to perform, common sense says that no one would
be asking a court to determine whose meaning prevails, i.e., the interpretive question
posed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201. The existence of a valid
contract must therefore be presumed. See also Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract

Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New
Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 246 (1966) ("The parol evidence rule, plain

76.

77.

78.
79.

meaning rule and traditional maxims of construction employed by courts to interpret
contracts all reinforce the notion of a rigorous doctrine of pacta sunt servanda
[agreements should be kept]."). See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 200--01 n.l47.
Specifically, if established on the facts, all the contract policing doctrines, such as
duress and misrepresentation, either result in a voidable contract or make a contract
unenforceable in whole or in part. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 164 (misrepresentation-voidable contract), 175 (duress-voidable contract), 177
(undue influence-voidable contract), 208 (unconscionability-unenforceable
contract) (1981). Clearly, a contract has to exist in the first instance to thereafter be
made voidable or unenforceable. See Hart, supra note 5, at 201 n.149.
Defenses to performance would include but not be limited to claims of mistake
(mutual and unilateral), as well as impracticability of performance and frustration of
purpose. By definition, these doctrines only apply to contracts already in existence.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) ("Where a mistake of both
parties [exists] at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made . .. , the contract is voidable .... ") (emphasis added); id. § 153
(unilateral mistake); id. § 261 (impracticability of performance-"[w]here, after a
contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable ... , his duty to render
that performance is discharged . . . . ") (emphasis added); id. § 265 (frustration of
purpose--containing similar language to § 261); see Hart, supra note 5, at 201 n.150.
Hart, supra note 5, Part III.B.2.
Lawsuits are very expensive. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete
Contracts in a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 725, 737 (2006)
("Litigation costs, specifically attorney fees, make it expensive to pursue a contract
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certain boilerplate contract clauses,80 and the fact that courts rarely let
parties out of their contracts, regardless of the legal excuse
advanced,81 make a successful rebuttal of the presumption of contract
validity highly unlikely.82

80.

81.

claim."); Hart, supra note 5, at 212 n.209; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 275, 326 (2008) ("Lawsuits are
expensive and time consuming, and therefore most individuals will not bring a suit
that has little or no potential for a damages award."); Robert Sprague & Karen L.
Page, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entrepreneur: Protecting
Naive Issuersfrom Sophisticated Investors, 8 WYO. L. REV. 167, 175 (2008) ("Filing a
lawsuit initiates a long, complex, and expensive process.").
These clauses include, for example, mandatory arbitration provisions, forum selection
clauses, and choice of law clauses, all of which have been found valid by the courts.
See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000)
(arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268
(1995) (arbitration clause); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595-97
(1991) (forum selection clause); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20,26-35 (1991) (arbitration clause); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 223-24 (1985) (arbitration clause); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1,2 (1972) (forum selection clause); Johnson v. Ventra Grp., Inc., 191 F.3d 732,
741 (6th Cir. 1999) (choice oflaw clause); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126,
1128-29 (9th Cir. 1993) (choice of law clause); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A.,
954 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (choice of law clause); Interfirst Bank Clifton v.
Fernandez, 853 F.2d 292, 293-95 (5th Cir. 1988) (choice of law clause); Hart, supra
note 5, at 213 n.212.
According to Professor Robert Lloyd:
We spend so much time on the unusual cases where courts find a
way to let people out of their bad deals that students begin to think
these cases are the norm. Students are amazed when I tell them
that it is virtually unheard of for a sophisticated party, or even a
party only moderately sophisticated, to prevail on an
unconscionability argument.
Yes, you can win an
unconscionability case if your client is poor and uneducated, and
if the other party is a sleazy organization that preys on poor
people, and if you're able to afford an appeal, and if you get
Skelly Wright on the bench. But absent these circumstances, the
client is going to be stuck with the documents she signs.
Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year
Contracts Course, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.1. 257, 267 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also E.
Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980 's: The Top Ten,
41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 203, 225 (1990) (,,[C]ontinued expansion of
unconscionability and related doctrines did not occur in the 1980s as expected.");
Hart, supra note 5, at 214-15 n.216; Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and
Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REv. 99, 99 (1990) ("Notwithstanding academic
writing that reports or urges expansion of the grounds of excuse, courts actually
remain extremely reluctant to release parties from their obligations."); Knapp, Private,
supra note 46, at 775 (noting that the burden of persuasion with respect to
unconscionability claims "is at best difficult, [and] at worst literally impossible to
satisfy"); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 110 ("The existence of . . . duress,
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The practical consequence of the presumption of contract validity
under either contract law system, therefore, is that a contract fonned
via mutual assent and consideration will usually be binding, which is
the first component of a "binding contract," and all of its terms
(reasonable and unreasonable) will most likely be enforceable in
court. 83 Enforceability, of course, represents the second component

82.
83.

unconscionability, and undue influence cannot, by themselves, sufficiently
accommodate marketplace inequities. The very dearth of cases where individuals are
successful in obtaining relief through those devices substantiates this point. This
result is compounded by the heavy burden of proof placed upon the claimant of such
relief." (footnotes omitted)).
See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 212-15.
There are "efficient terms" and "fair use" objections to the claim made in the text that
all the terms of a contract, including the unreasonable ones, would probably be valid
and enforceable. The efficient terms objection is that terms in standard forms are
efficient, even if most people do not read them, either because (I) a profit-maximizing
business will offer optimal terms under the assumption that the preferences of the
marginal consumer are the same as those of the average consumer, see Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The
Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 449 (2008)
[hereinafter, Marotta-Wurgler, Competition] (discussing the argument of A. Michael
Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6:2 BELL J. ECON. 417, 417-29 (1975));
or (2) there is a subset of informed buyers who do read the terms of standard forms
and are, therefore, willing to pay more for products with better standard terms.
Because a business cannot discriminate between reading and non-reading buyers, the
self-interested business will offer better terms to all buyers. Marotta-Wurgler,
Competition, supra at 454 (discussing the argument of Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979)).
Two brief responses to the efficient terms objection are in order. To begin with,
whether "efficient" is all that can or should be expected from terms in standard form
contracts is debatable. CfMichael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Is There a
Method to the Madness? Why Creative and Counterintuitive Proposals Are
Counterproductive, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 21, 22
(Mark D. White ed., 2009). In addition, initial empirical research by Professor
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, makes me very skeptical of the efficient terms objection.
Marotta-Wurgler's research finds that standard terms in software license agreements
are biased in favor of sellers (the party that drafted the forms). Marotta-Wurgler,
Competition, supra at 459-63. Much more empirical work needs to be done to decide
this particular objection, one way or the other.
Even assuming there are unreasonable terms in a contract, the fair use objection
questions whether the stronger, and presumably drafting, party will actually enforce
them, given fairness and reputational norms that would constrain such behavior.
Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 679,
703 (2004) (arguing that the "holder of an entitlement ... may unilaterally waive or
underenforce that entitlement[.)"); id at 708; see also id at 707 (the reputational
norm); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
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of a binding contract, because enforceability overtly implicates the
state. 84 Specifically, the state will use its sovereign power (i.e., its
"judges, sheriffs, and other state agents") on behalf of one party to
enforce the rights expressed in that contract against the resisting
party.85 Thus, modem contract law, just like classical contract law,
makes contracts binding.
The implications for the parties to the contract cannot be
overlooked or overstated. Because contracts are made binding in the
ways described above, the party that gets to dictate or impose terms
during contract formation will usually get to keep and use those terms
in the event of any subsequent contract dispute. 86 Clearly, the party
that has the ability to impose terms during contract formation is the
party with the bargaining power to do so. Hence, formation is the
core, because this is where the stronger contracting party's power

84.
85.
86.

Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1513-15 (1998) (the fairness norm).
This objection also poses an empirical question, and I am unaware of any study that
addresses it. Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence, I am very skeptical of
this objection as well. The extent of market constraints placed on sellers by
reputational concerns is contested at best and is arguably rather minimal. See Richard
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 723-24 (1985);
Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy 0/ Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY
LJ. 587, 595 & n.21 (1995); Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modem
Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1420, n.lO (2004); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory o/Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,907 & n.23 (1986).
Finally, institutional constraints could undercut the fairness norms. Briefly, the
people responsible for enforcement decisions within a company (e.g., legal counsel)
will likely be different from the people who initially sold the product or service (e.g.,
the sales department). Different considerations, therefore, would motivate the
enforcement decision.
Finally, both the efficient terms and fair use objections discount too steeply (i) the
potential in terrorem effect the existence of unreasonable terms in the contract could
have on the weaker party if a dispute were to arise during performance of the contract;
(ii) the bargaining advantage such terms provide the stronger party in any settlement
negotiations; and, ultimately, (iii) the fact that such terms would be asserted by the
stronger party in any ensuing litigation, unless the client agreed otherwise. It is
difficult to envision the litigation scenario in which a client would instruct its
attorneys not to use any terms in the contract that would benefit it in the litigation.
Absent the client's consent to refrain from using such terms, the attorney(s) for the
stronger party could be violating ethical rules by failing to assert claims or defenses
based on unreasonable terms in the contract. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT PREAMBLE '\1'\12, 19, R. 1.1, l.3 (2007); Hart, supra note 5, at 216.
See Hart, supra note 5, at 212-15.
Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585-86; see also Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at
483-85.
See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 216-17.
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becomes embedded and largely immunized from effective
challenge. 87
Finally, in addition to its core, underlying assumptions and end
result, there is one other aspect of the modem contract law system
that must be taken into account. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
framework for modem contract law is designed to be selflegitimating. 88 This point is illustrated by the way in which the
system approaches problems. Specifically, because the modem
contract law system is premised on the assumptions discussed above,
it means that problems within contract law are acknowledged only if
they contradict one or more of those assumptions. 89 From there, a
remedy is adopted, which mayor may not actually work, but is one
that will nevertheless reaffirm and thereby relegitimate the
assumption( s) originally contradicted. 90
For example, modem contract law assumes that unequal
bargaining power exists,91 but in an unproblematic way.92 Unequal
bargaining power, however, presents significant problems for modem
contract law when it is used to procure a one-sided (or bad) bargain.93
It also presents a problem when it takes the form of information

87.
88.

89.
90.
91.

92.

93.

Id.
That the framework is self-legitimating is not surprising, because any system that
purports to be comprehensive, like modern contract law claims to be, would have to
be able to address problems that come up in ways that do not end up undermining the
entire system. Cf Feinman, Critical, supra note 58, at 832 (demonstrating how
modern contract law attempted to solve the problems of classical contract law but in a
way that did not completely undermine the former system); Feinman, Theory, supra
note 36 (documenting the ways in which modern contract law addressed various
critiques leveled against the system); Gabel & Feinman, supra note 45 (exposing the
legitimating function contract law serves in society in general). My concern,
therefore, is not that the framework is self-legitimizing but rather in discovering and
exposing what else the framework legitimizes.
See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 576.
Much of the discussion in the text is based on Duncan Kennedy's discussion of
unequal bargaining power. See generally id. at 620-24.
It is a form of market imperfection. See supra text accompanying notes 1-45 (modern
system acknowledging market imperfections); Kennedy, supra note 42, at 577;
Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 96.
Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 144 "The legal doctrine of inequality of
bargaining power occupies a strange place in contract law. As an explicitly
acknowledged legal concept, inequality of bargaining power is seemingly of little
moment. . .. [I]nequality of bargaining power alone is not a sufficient justification for
judicial intervention into contract disputes." Id. It is simply not explicitly discussed.
See generally Hart, supra note 5.
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asymmetry94 (i.e., when one party is in possession of relevant
information that is deemed necessary for the other party to make an
informed decision about whether to enter into a contract).95
To correct the problems of bad bargains and information
asymmetry, modem contract law relies upon its contract policing
doctrines and disclosure statutes, respectively.96 Unfortunately, these
solutions do not work very wel1. 97 But by providing solutions, the
modern contract law system is able to show that the problem of
unequal bargaining power merely requires "reform of exceptional
cases and intelligent response to abuses. ,,98 In other words, because
problems created by unequal bargaining power can be remedied with
discrete and relatively easy-to-implement solutions, unequal
bargaining power is shown to be the exception,99 not the norm. 100
And because it can essentially treat unequal bargaining power as the
exception, modem contract law is able to reaffirm and re-legitimize
its assumption that unequal bargaining power exists but only at the

94.

See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Bargaining Power in Contract Theory, in VISIONS OF
CONTRACT THEORY 85, 93-94 (Larry A. Dimatteo, Robert A. Prentice, Blake D.
Morant, and Daniel D. Barnhizer 2007) [hereinafter, Barnhizer, Bargaining Power]
("Legal and nonlegal observers recognize qualities such as superior information ... as
sources of power."); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl. E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 649 (2011) ("[The purpose of mandatory
disclosure is] to keep the discloser from abusing its superior position.").
95.
Cf Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 147 ("[F]raud, deceit or misrepresentation
may be analyzed as an inequality of bargaining power generated by a monopoly on
truthful information held by one party to a transaction.").
96.
See Hart, supra note 5 (documenting that the expanded contract policing doctrinesunconscionability, economic duress, and misrepresentation-were modern contract's
solution to the unequal bargaining power that produces a bad bargain problem); infra
Part I.B (discussing purpose of disclosure statutes).
97.
See Hart, supra note 5 (explaining in detail why contract policing doctrines do not
adequately address the unequal bargaining power that produces a bad bargain
problem); infra Part III.B (explaining why disclosure statutes do not work).
98.
Kennedy, supra note 42, at 620.
99.
Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in
Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571 (1985) ("Modern contract scholars tend to
see ... relations of domination as aberrational situations, which, for good or evil ...
contract law has evolved various curative doctrines to police. In other words, there is
not that much of a problem, and contract law can take care of what problem there
is.").
100. Kennedy, supra note 42, at 621 ("In this context, the doctrine of unequal bargaining
power has the appeal that it presupposes that most of the time there is equal
bargaining power, so that freedom of contract is the appropriate norm. It is an
exceptional doctrine, unthreatening to basic arrangements, however critical of
parti cu lar cases.").

2011J

Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions

23

margins, as an exception that proves the rule and supports the general
paradigm of equality. 101
By approaching problems in this way, specifically by defining
perceived problems in terms of its assumptions and then providing
solutions consistent with these assumptions, the modem contract law
system is not only able to stave off criticism of the system as a whole,
it can also show that its framework remains intact. Both of these byproducts are integral to the continuing operation of the modern
contract law system. Indeed, this is what enables the modem contract
law system to be self-legitimating.

B.

Disclosure Statutes as a Modern Contract Law Remedial Tool

Disclosure statutes play an important role in the modem contract
law system. They are certainly not new. They have been in use in
the United States for decades 102 and a lot has been written about
them. 103 At their most basic, disclosure statutes are statutes that
101.

102.

103.

A more concrete example of this phenomenon is laid out by Professor John Dawson in
his 1947 article, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253
(1947). Dawson wrote:
[A]n extreme disproportion in values in a bargain transaction
requires explanation, and the explanation can usually be found in
some misplaced reliance on the opposite party's good faith, some
misleading partial disclosure, or some extreme inequality of the
parties in knowledge, experience, or economic resources. If
inequality in values is thus traced to its source in the conditions or
the relations of the parties, the grant of judicial remedies seems no
longer to endanger the economic foundations of an individualistic
society. On the contrary, the function of judicial remedies [like
economic duress, misrepresentation and unconscionability]
becomes a policing function, the detection and correction of those
factors which disturb and disrupt the "market."
Id. at 281.
See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 400 (1973) [hereinafter, Whitford, Disclosure]
("One of the oldest and most prevalent methods of regulating consumer transactions
has been to require the seller to disclose to his consumer buyer various types of
information about their contractual transaction.") (footnote omitted); 15 U.S.c. §§
1601-1615, 1631-1649, 1661, 1667(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2004) (implemented by the
Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2005»; Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 101112, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000».
See, e.g., Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate
Mortgages, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 31, 33-43 (2008); Matthew A. Edwards, The
Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus.

24

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 41

require certain pieces of infonnation to be disclosed by one party to
the other. 104 They exist to a large extent in the consumer protection
arena (e.g., the Truth in Lending Ad05 and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act) but are not limited to this area. 106 For example,
several provisions of Article 2 of the Unifonn Commercial Code also
reqUIre disclosure, namely the provlSlons on good faith, 107

104.
105.

106.

107.

& FIN. 362, 407-13 (2007); The Honorable Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl,
Acquiring an Historical Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties,
104 COM. LJ. 168, 181-82 (1999); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of
the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons Learnedfrom the Caveat Emptor Doctrine,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 119 (2008); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday
Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing
Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1129-35 (2008); Alex Polonsky, "Tanks for the
Memories:" Abandoning Caveat Emptor for the Transfers of Residential Property
Contaminated with Petroleum from Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 22 VT. L.
REV. 979,1003 (1998); Kathleen McNamara Tomcho, Commercial Real Estate Buyer
Beware: Sellers May Have the Right to Remain Silent, 70 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1571,1572,
1589-90 (1997); Jessica P. Wilde, Violations of Zoning Ordinances, the Covenant
Against Encumbrances, and Marketability of Title: How Purchasers Can Be Better
Protected, 23 TOURO L. REV. 199, 228-32, 243-46 (2007); Willis, supra note 26;
Whitford, Disclosure, supra note 102.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 649.
Truth in Lending Act, IS V.S.c. §§ 1601-1615, 1631-1649, 1661, 1667(f) (2000 &
Supp. III 2004) (implemented by the Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226 (2005)).
Mandatory disclosure is certainly not limited to contract law. Torts and criminal law,
for example, both have mandatory disclosure rules. In tort law, mandatory disclosure
takes the form of the informed consent doctrine. In criminal law, the Miranda
warnings constitute a mandatory disclosure rule. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra
note 94, at 661-62 (informed consent and Miranda warnings, respectively). What all
of these mandatory disclosures have in common is that they require certain disclosures
to be made that will enable an individual to make an informed decision about her
contracts, health care, or constitutional rights, for example. Id. at 3-15.
Robert S. Summers, writing in 1968, discussed good faith in terms of an "excluder"
analysis, meaning that good faith was to be defined, or would "take[] on specific and
variant meanings by way of contrast with the specific and variant forms of bad faith
which judges decide to prohibit." Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L.
REV. 195,202 (1968). Summers argued that good faith included the duty to disclose
material facts under certain circumstances. Id. at 203; see also Emily M.S. Houh,
Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of
Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2003). In discussing
Summers's work, Houh writes, "because courts define the withholding of relevant
information in the contracting process as bad faith, a contracting party must disclose
all such information in order to satisfy the implied obligation of good faith." Id. See
generally V.C.c. §§ 1-20I(b)(20), 1-304, 2-103(1)(b) (2001).
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unconscionability,108 and warranty,109 and they apply to merchants as
well as consumers. I 10
Several related reasons for disclosure statutes are advanced by
courts and scholars.
Disclosure statutes supposedly limit the
advantage of the party with superior bargaining power, III allow the
market to work,1I2 and allow for the possibility of individual
choice.1I3 By putting all of this together, it appears that the main
108.

109.

110.
Ill.
112.

113.

See U.c.c § 2-302 (2001); Whitford, Disclosure, supra note 102, at 401 (citing
unconscionability as the example, Whitford notes that "[t]he Uniform Commercial
Code, in what few efforts it makes to regulate consumer transactions, generally
stresses disclosure regulation"). See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability
and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 498 (\ 967).
See U.C.C §§ 2-313 (express warranties), 2-314 (the implied warranty of
merchantability), 2-316 (disclaimer of warranties) (2001); Summers, supra note 107,
at 229-30 (arguing that good faith may require sellers to disclose information to their
buyers under their obligation to sell "merchantable goods" per the implied warranty of
merchantability).
Nothing in the text or comments of any of the cited Article 2 provisions limits their
application to consumer transactions.
Cf JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10.1, at 430
(3d ed. 1987) (discussing government controls generally).
Scott J. Burnham, The Regulation of Rent-To-Own Transactions, 3 Loy. CONSUMER
L. REV. 40, 41 (1991) ("The theory behind disclosure is that it allows the market to
work. Theoretically, consumers who know what interest rates are offered by various
sellers will 'shop around' for favorable credit terms just as they shop around for the
price of the goods themselves."); Michael J. Wisdom, An Empirical Study of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (\ 979) ("The stated
purposes of the [Magnuson-Moss Warranty] Act were to improve the clarity and
accuracy of information contained in consumer product warranties and to increase
competition in the marketing of consumer products."). See generally Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? 1-3 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org.,
Working Paper No. 10-54, 2010), available at http://ssrn.comiabstract=1713860
[hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure] (reviewing several disclosure initiatives
whose purpose was to improve market functions).
Cf W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of
Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 629 (1996) (arguing, in essence, that hazard
warnings, which are clearly a type of disclosure, are attractive because they allow for
the possibility of individual choice). "The flexibility of warnings enables those who
are unwilling to incur risks to take appropriate precautions or to avoid the risky
activity, and also enables individuals who are willing to engage in the risky behavior
to do so." Id.; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 704-05
(1999) (discussing the Viscusi article). Cf LOUIS KApLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
MICROECONOMICS 40 (2004) ("[W]hen government provides information about
products to consumers, individuals can decide on the basis of their desires after
considering the information whether to purchase those products. Hence, purchase
decisions tend to be socially desirable."). The same argument would seem to apply
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reason for adopting a disclosure· regime is to correct bargaining
imbalances and market failure, primarily in the form of information
asymmetries, thereby improving the quality of the contractual
decisions made. 114
Thus, despite being creatures of statute, disclosure statutes are a
quintessential modem contract law remedial tool for two reasons.
First, they incorporate the norms of both the classical and modern
systems. 115 They preserve individual autonomy, the core value of the
classical legal system,116 while simultaneously deploying the modern
norms of fairness and cooperation. 117 More specifically, disclosure
statutes protect the parties' freedom of contract-the classical
autonomy value l18-by continuing to allow the parties to contract for
essentially whatever they want. At the same time, they marginally
limit the parties' power to contract by mandating disclosure of certain
relevant information, which represents a deployment of the modern
norms of fairness and cooperation. 119

114.

115.

116.
117.
118.

119.

when a party, as opposed to the government and pursuant to a disclosure requirement,
provides the information to the consumer.
Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 324 (2005); John Roddy, Reversing Field: Is There a
Trend Toward Abrogating Truth in Lending?, 1998 PRAC. LAW INST. COMM. LAW AND
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 637, 642, available at 772 PLI/Comm 637 (West
1998) ("The purpose of TILA is to enable consumers to intelligently shop for
credit."); Whitford, Disclosure, supra note 102, at 403 ("[P]roponents of disclosure
statutes typically presume that conspicuous and comprehensible disclosure will cause
many consumers to change their buying behavior so as either to refrain from buying
particular products or services that they otherwise would have bought, or to shop more
carefully among competing products or services."). Cf Edward L. Rubin, Types of
Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1910-11 (2000)
(discussing information asymmetry as a particular type of market failure).
Recall that the modem contract law system supplements, but does not replace, the
classical norms of individual autonomy and liberty with norms of fairness and
cooperation. See supra notes 44-46.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
See supra text accompanying note 44.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 681 ("[M]andated disclosure serves the
autonomy principle. It implements the belief that people make better decisions for
themselves than anyone can make for them and that people are presumptively entitled
to freedom in making decisions.").
By requiring the party with superior information to share it with her contracting
partner, disclosure statues deploy the modem contract law norms of fairness (by
attempting to level at least the information playing field) and cooperation (by literally
mandating the disclosure of relevant information).
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Second, disclosure statutes are designed to affect the core of
contract law (fonnation)'20 while simultaneously leaving it intact.
That is, the primary purpose of disclosure statues is to alleviate
bargaining inequalities, at least in the fonn of some information
asymmetry,l2l thereby increasing the quality of the "weaker
contracting party's,,122 mutual assent.
Disclosing relevant
information during the contract formation stage, in other words, is
supposed to produce an informed choice. It is then much easier to
justify holding a party to her contract via the presumption of contract
validity'23 if that party appears to have made an informed decision to
enter into the contract to begin with. Disclosure statutes, therefore,
affect the core of contract by specifically targeting and manipulating
mutual assent. But ultimately, and consistent with the modern
contract law system's approach to formation,'24 disclosure statutes
leave the core completely intact, because mutual assent is established
and a contract is still formed.
Disclosure statutes, therefore, fit squarely within the modern
contract law framework. This is because all of the framework's
underlying assumptions '25 are at work in a disclosure-statute scenario.
Specifically, if a contracting party receives certain disclosures in a
specific manner, then that party will, in the first instance, read and
understand them. 126 Thus, for example, under TILA, creditors are
required to disclose in writing to the borrower, among many other
things,127 the finance charge '28 and the annual percentage rate. 129
120.
121.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.

128.

See supra text accompanying notes 64-71 (discussing formation as core of contract
law).
See supra text accompanying notes 111-16 (discussing the primary purpose of
disclosure statutes).
By "weaker contracting party," I am simply referring to the contracting party that is
not in possession of the information deemed relevant by the disclosure statute or rule.
See supra text accompanying notes 69-82 (discussing the presumption of contract
validity).
See supra text accompanying notes 64-71 (discussing modem contract's approach to
formation).
See supra notes 56-65.
Cf Willis, supra note 26, at 748 ("[The thicker conception of the rational actor]
assumes that [people] will, once given the information in the disclosures, use it to
choose whether and which loan to take based on a rational calculus of their financial
self-interest. ").
For example, the creditor is required to disclose the "total sale price," the "total of
payments," and any dollar charge or percentage amount that may be imposed solely
because of a late payment. See IS U.S.c. § J638(a)(7) (2000) (total sale price); id. §
1638(a)(5) (total of payments); id. § 1638(a)(l 0) (late payment charges).
15 U.S.c. § 1638(a)(3) (2000).
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Once provided with these disclosures, the theory is that the borrower
in the TILA example will then be able to make an informed
contractual decision about what the loan will cost and whether she
can afford it. 130
The decision that modem contract law is ultimately concerned
with, however, is the borrower's decision about whether to enter into
the contract or not. If the hypothetical borrower chooses to enter into
the contract with the lender under these circumstances, then society
can feel comfortable and even justified holding that borrower to that
contract. I3l
Disclosure statutes therefore seem to presuppose that the contracts
formed after mandated disclosures are private transactions between
private parties who are most likely strangers to one another and
therefore bargaining at arm's length (i.e., CitiMortgage and Mary
Smith, in the hypothetical); individuals act as rational market actors
in reaching their contractual decisions, meaning that the individual
who receives the information via the disclosure statute will be able to
correctly process that information and then rank her preferences
according to her expected utility; and any imperfections in the market
in the form of information asymmetries will not have an adverse
impact on the parties' contractual decisions because disclosure
statutes were specifically created to remedy them.
If these premises are correct, the argument continues, then parties
should be free to bargain over just about anything they want (which
is, of course, the very classical freedom of contract ideal); 132 and the
law should give their bargain literal effect, that is, protect the parties'
"justified" contractual expectations, because that contract is the

15 U.S.c. § 1664(d) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.24 (2005); see also Willis, supra note
26, at 744 ("The APR is intended to express the total annual cost of borrowing,
including interest and other scheduled charges and fees imposed by the lender ... so
that borrowers can comparison price shop .... ").
130. KApLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 113, at 38 ("By providing consumers with
information, government enables them to base their purchase decisions on correct
information and thereby to avoid mistakes."); Willis, supra note 26, at 712.
131. Cf Morant, Race, supra, note 44 at 909-10 ("Emphasis is placed upon the
enforcement of agreements if objective assent is manifested."); Omri Ben-Shahar, The
Myth of the "Opportunity to Read" in Contract Law,S EUR. REv. CONT. L. 1, (John
M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 415, 2008) [hereinafter, Ben-Shahar,
Myth] ("[The] idea of implied-assent-to-available-but-unread-terms is appealing to
scholars because of the premise ... that it accords greater respect to individuals-that
it bolsters the 'autonomy' of people.").
132. Freedom of contract is also the embodiment of the classical individual autonomy
norm writ large.

129.
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product of their voluntary and informed choice. \33 This latter
statement is, of course, freedom of contract's well-known corollary
that contracts should be kept. 134 The state's role in all of this is very
neutral and minimal, having specified only that disclosures are
required in certain limited commercial contracting situations, and the
content of the disclosures to be made. 135
II.

CONTRACTS AND STATE POWER

The problem with making contracts binding is that all of the
assumptions modern contract law relies on 136 to justify this cardinal
principle are deeply problematic in theory and in practice. 137 Because

133. ATIYAH, supra note 51, at 403 ("[The fifth principle of classical contract law was that]
the content of the contract, the terms and the price and the subject-matter, are entirely
for the parties to settle."); Morant, Race, supra note 44, at 901 ("Self-governance and
private autonomy undergird the classical theory, elaborated by the belief that private
parties were in the best positions to fashion bargains appropriate for their needs. As a
consequence, there is no need for paternalistic [state] intervention since autonomous
individuals, exercising their free will and driven by their own preferences, will
ostensibly formulate an agreement which is fitting and deserved.").
134. Given the way the modern contract law system is set up, this corollary actually means
that contracts that are freely entered into will usually be enforced. This is because the
corollary in practice takes the form of an almost insurmountable presumption of
contract validity. See supra Part I.A (discussing the ways in which modern contract
law makes contracts binding); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts 0/ Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom o/Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 629-31 (1943); Mark
Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom o/Contract, and The "Rise and Fall", 79 B.U. L. REV.
263, 287 (1999) ("The traditional view is that freedom increases or decreases as
freedom of contract increases or decreases. Freedom is maximized by allowing
individuals to enter into contracts without fear of governmental sanctions for doing so,
and by government enforcing those contracts-against the will of one of the
contracting parties, if necessary." (footnote omitted»; Todd D. Rakoff, Is "Freedom
From Contract" Necessarily A Libertarian Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477,47980 (analyzing Sir George Jessel's famous statement about freedom of contract and
arguing that freedom of contract includes "three legal points: agreements (1) 'when
entered into freely and voluntarily,' (2) 'shall be held sacred,' and (3) 'shall be
enforced"'); Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 479 ("[The classical theorists'] basic
model assumed that the parties were free to agree on whatever terms they wanted.
Freedom of contract meant that the parties were free to make or not make contracts,
and that when they made contracts the courts would enforce the terms to which the
parties had agreed. ").
135. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
136. See supra Part I.A.
137. Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 2 ("Contract law owes its foundations to the
days of the arm's length bargain ...-to the notion that contract provisions come
prior to the transaction and are known and custom designed by the parties. . .. It is a
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the assumptions are dubious at best, modem contract law cannot
justify holding parties to their contracts. Nevertheless, contract law
continues to do just that. Consequently, continuing to bind parties to
their contracts, absent the justification that the assumptions provide,
is an unmitigated exercise of state power. 138 Such use of state power
smacks of absolutism, which stands in stark contrast to the
characterization of contract law as promoting voluntary transactions
between private parties.
A.

The Assumptions in Theory and Practice

There are six 139 well-established assumptions that modem contract
law uses to justify making contracts binding and explain modem
contract's use of disclosure statutes as a remedial tool. 140 In this part,
the contra-assumption for each of the six postulates is argued to
document the claim that all six of them are flawed in theory and in
practice.
1.

The Market Is Not Self-Regulating or Largely Outside State
Control

The Legal Realists showed us more than three-quarters of a
century ago that the market is not self-regulating or largely outside of
state control. They argued that the creation of the state was
specifically intended to alter the distribution of power and wealth in

heroic scholarly ideal, however, to preserve this module in the era of mass standard
fonn contracts.").
138. A few words on the distinction being drawn in the text between state power and
unmitigated state power should suffice. It is abundantly clear that contracts are only
binding because the state says they are. See infra Part II.A.3. By definition, "[a]
contract is a promise . . . for the breach of which the law gives a remedy."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I (1981). Since a contract is only a
contract if the law says it is, it seems redundant to belabor what in essence is already a
truism. The point the article is making, however, is that the contract law system relies
on assumptions about the contracting parties to justifY the use of state power to make
contracts binding. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65 (discussing the
assumptions). Absent the justification provided by the assumptions, therefore, making
contracts binding becomes an unmitigated use of state power.
139. Some of the assumptions are so related to one another that the only logical way to
discuss them is together. For example, the modem contract law assumption about the
role of the state subsumes the claims that (1) the state's role is neutral and minimal,
and (2) contracts are between two private parties. See infra Part II.A.4.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65 (the assumptions), 120-130 (relationship to
disclosure statutes).
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society.141 This goal was accomplished through legal rules. Indeed,
it was widely understood that legal rules were necessary because real
freedom depended "upon opportunities supplied by institutions that
involve legal regulation.,,142 It was also understood that "mere
freedom as absence of restraint, without positive power to achieve
what we deem good, is empty and of no real value.,,143 The state
therefore created legal rules, both formal (i.e., through legislation,
agency rules, and court decisionsY44 and "informal," via private
agreement. 145
The legal rules created by private agreement were predicated on
property rights,146 which eventually included the right to contract. 147
The property rights a person owned determined that person's
bargaining power in the markee 48 and, ultimately, what that person
141. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 562; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482. See
generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 10-11
(1928) [hereinafter Cohen, Property]; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1943) [hereinafter Hale, Duress];
Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 451 (1920)
[hereinafter Hale, Minorities]. This insight is also well-established in historical
discourse. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); HENDRICK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870
(1983); RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM
FROM FRANKLIN TO MORE (1995); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); CHRISTOPHER L.
TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REpUBLIC (1993).
142. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 591; see also Joseph W. Singer, Things That We
Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a
Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL'y REv. 139, 141 (2008) [hereinafter
Singer, Standards] ("[The Legal Realists taught us that o]ur regulations, both statutory
and common law, shape the house that we live in, and the liberty that we value comes
from having built that house and the environment around it.").
143. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 560; see also id. at 561-62 ("[T]he theory of ...
non-interference of the government in business[] is not really held consistently by
those who so frequently invoke it.").
144. !d. at 586.
145. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471-74 (1923)
[hereinafter Hale, Coercion]; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 34-35; Singer,
Realism, supra note 35, at 487-88.
146. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 47174; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 34-35; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 48788.
147. Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 570.
148. Needless to say, the more one party owns, the more bargaining power that party has
and the more that party can dictate contract terms. See generally Hale, Duress, supra
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would be allowed to acquire. 149 Ownership, therefore, also bestowed
the power on individuals to dictate legal rules via their agreements
because the state enforced the rights contained in a contract. 150
Indeed, the legal rules embodied in agreements and promises l51 were
enforced specifically "to enable people to rely on them ... and thus
make the path of enterprise more secure.,,152 In fact, an increase in
commercial activity inevitably led to more regulation. 153
Fonnal and informal legal rules, therefore, existed and continue to
exist by virtue of the existence of the state itself. Legal rules simply
do not exist separate and apart from the fabric of society or the
market. Legal rules create both.
Thus, the Realists argued persuasively that the market is itself a
regulatory structure created by the state. 154 Our existing and
developing formal and informal legal rules create a comprehensive
network of regulations. ISS This network of regulations provides both
the foundation and framework upon which the supposedly self-

149.

150.
151.

152.
153.
154.
155.

note 141, at 627-28 ("[T]he law endows some with rights that are more advantageous
than those with which it endows others. It is with these unequal rights that men
bargain and exert pressure on one another. These rights give birth to the unequal
fruits of bargaining.").
According to Morris Cohen:
Property law . . . determines what men shall acquire. Thus,
protecting the property rights of a landlord means giving him the
right to collect rent, protecting the property of a railroad or a
public service corporation means giving it the right to make
certain charges. Hence the ownership of land and machinery,
with the rights of drawing rent, interest, etc. determines the future
distribution of the goods that will come into being---determines
what share of such goods various individuals shall acquire.
Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 13.
Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585-87.
Morris Cohen explains:
[W]hen a trade union makes an agreement with an association of
employers, or even with a single employer, the result is law not
only for those "represented" at the signing of the papers but for all
those who wish to enter the industry at any time that the
agreement is in force. This is in general true of all more or less
permanently organized partnerships, companies, corporations, or
other groups; and enforceable agreements between individuals, no
matter on how limited a scale, are similarly part of the law by
virtue of the general rules of state action that apply to them.
ld. at 587.
ld. at 555-57,587,591.
ld. at 558.
Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 141.
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 35, at 99-100; Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 150.
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regulating, free market is built, operated, and continues to operate. 156
Indeed, absent the legal structure provided by state-imposed
regulation (e.g., courts, legislatures, agencies), the self-regulating free
market would be unrecognizable as a market at all. 157
Markets, however, are not just shaped by regulation. Deregulation
also has to be taken into account because when the state fails to
intervene in or deregulates a particular market, the state effectively
alters the power relations that take place within it. 158 By refraining
from acting in a formal manner, the state essentially leaves informal
rules and rule-making in place. 159 In effect, the state delegates to the
party with more property rights and, hence, more bargaining power,
the freedom to exercise superior bargaining power over the weaker
party in a given market. 160 Thus, the state determines the distribution
of power and wealth in society via its chosen mechanism of the
market "both when it act[s] to limit freedom and when it fail[s] to
limit the freedom of some to dominate others.,,161 The market,
therefore, is not self-regulating or largely outside of state control.
Of course, this discussion begs an important question. What is a
"market?" At its most basic, a market is simply "[a] place of
commercial activity in which articles are bought and sold.,,162 In
marketing, however, a "market" requires three things. 163 There must
be consumers or organizations interested in a particular product.
Those consumers or organizations must have the resources to
purchase the product.
Finally, the law, including applicable
regulations, must permit the consumers or organizations to acquire
the product. 164

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 150.
Id. at 141.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-56.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-56.
Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482. Sometimes the state accomplishes this by
designating something a "non-market." For example, there is technically no "market"
for human organs, because it is illegal in the United States to sell one's organs. See
National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2006); NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of
1987 § lO(a).
161. Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482; see also Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at
10-13.
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
163. Market Definition, NETMBA, http:www.netmba.com/marketing/marketldefinition/
(last visited Nov. 26, 2011).
164. Id.
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So in the hypothetical loan transaction between CitiMortgage and
Ms. Smith, the relevant market depends on the product being bought
and sold. One could argue that the home mortgage loan itself is the
product, in which case the relevant market would be the financial
market. But because Ms. Smith obtained the home mortgage loan
only to enable her to purchase a single-family house, it seems more
plausible that the product at issue in the hypothetical is the house
itself, which makes for a much more complicated market.
A veritable web of laws is implicated in constructing the
residential housing market. For example, the construction of the real
estate market in a particular locality, in this instance a racially
segregated neighborhood (a.k.a. a "predominantly minority
neighborhood"), is the result of specific government policies and
actions,165 including, but not limited to, New Deal housing programs,
like the Home Owners Loan Corporation,166 and agencies,
particularly the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans
Administration;167 federal and state highway programs;168 state urban
165. For a much more complete discussion of the role of government in establishing and
perpetuating racially segregated neighborhoods, see generally James A. Kushner,
Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial
Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979) and DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Other sources include James A. Kushner, The
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42
V AND. L. REv. 1049, 1061-67 (1989) [hereinafter, Kushner, Second] and Reggie Oh,
Comment, Apartheid in America: Residential Segregation and the Colorline in the
Twenty-First Century, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385, 388-98 (1995).
166. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was a federal entity created in 1933 by
the Roosevelt Administration. Oh, supra note 165, at 390. Its primary purpose was to
HOLC initiated and
increase home ownership among American families. Id.
institutionalized discriminatory lending practices such that most black residents and
neighborhoods received little to no federally subsidized mortgage loans. Id. at 391.
As a result, the practices of HOLC ended up increasing home ownership only for
white families in white neighborhoods. Id. at 390-91.
167. According to Professor Kushner:
The most dramatic cause of segregation, however, was the
mortgage insurance and loan programs administered by the
Veterans Administration and the Federal Housing Administration,
programs which provided the financing for America's suburbs.
Regulations required the financed properties to be segregated by
conditioning subdivision approval on the inclusion of racial
covenants or equitable servitudes.
Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1063 (footnote omitted); see also Oh, supra note
165, at 391-92.
168. Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1064 ("The federal highway program also helped
fund the segregated suburban exodus. In addition, state and local highway and urban
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renewal programs; 169 and, perhaps surprisingly, United States
Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 170 Milliken v.
Bradley,171 and San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez. 172 Professor James Kushner argues that, "[a]n audit of
current governmental spending, taxation, and other policies would
disclose a pattern of programs and policies that carry a segregating
impact and would implicate the federal government as the primary
contributor to and implementor of segregation." 173
And, of course, the loan that made the sale of the house in the
hypothetical possible is a product of the financial market. The
financial market, therefore, must also be considered a part of the
larger residential housing market.
It is beyond the scope of this article to list all of the laws
implicated in fabricating the residential housing market, but it is
possible to provide some indication of how extensive and pervasive
the law is in creating it, by focusing on the financial market. I make
no claim that the examples laid out below are exhaustive. Nor am I
attempting to engage in the substantive debate about whether the
regulation, or lack thereof, of the financial market was sufficient to
stave off or minimize the financial crisis that accompanied the crash
of the housing market in the United States. The examples provided,
however, are illustrative of the larger point that markets are not selfregulating or largely outside of state control. Indeed, the law created
the market that enabled the subprime loan between CitiMortgage and
Ms. Smith in the hypothetical to be made.

169.
170.

171.

172.

173.

renewal programs produced massive relocation which resettled white displacees in
suburbia and blacks in the increasingly concentrated minority sections of central
cities.").
ld.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). According to Professor Kushner,
"though invalidating intentionally segregated public schools, [Brown] encouraged
white flight to the suburbs and their new, all-white school districts, while urban
districts were taken to court to accomplish the promise of Brown." Kushner, Second,
supra note 165, at 1065.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). By "limit[ing] urban school remedies to
the urban district absent a finding of a violation by the suburban districts, [Milliken]
insulated the white suburbs from busing and further encouraged the establishment of
separate societies." Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1065.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); Kushner, Second,
supra note 165, at 1065 n.61 ("In refusing to equalize district school funding in
[Rodriguez], ... the Burger Court approved of racially 'separate and unequal' schools,
and thus neighborhoods, in a cruel and ironic play on the discredited Plessy
doctrine.") (citation omitted).
Kushner, Second, supra note 165, at 1064.
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A very brief time line of the regulatory history of the financial
market would include, among other things, the following pieces of
legislation:
1863: The National Bank Actl 74 (established the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC»;175
1913: The Federal Reserve Act l76 (established the Federal
Reserve System (FRS»;
1933: The Banking Act, a.k.a., the Glass-Steagall Act 177
(established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
supervised state banks not otherwise under federal regulation,
extended federal supervision to all commercial banks, and
separated commercial from investment banking); 178
1933: The Securities Act l79 (established a federal disclosure
regime for companies seeking to issue stocks for sale to the
general public); 180
1934: The Securities Exchange Act l81 (established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and implemented
requirements for companies to file registration statements in
conjunction with initial public offerings and annual
disclosures); 182

174. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 5,13 Stat. 99-100 (1864) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 21-21a (2006)).
175. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE
OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 6 fig.1 (2009); National Bank Act,
ch. 106, § 5, 13 Stat. 99-100 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § I (2006)).
176. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 1,38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
177. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. §§
1811-1832 (2006)).
178. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Damon Silvers &
Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and the Financial Crisis-Linkages

Between Deregulation in Labor Markets, Housing Finance Markets, and the Broader
Financial Markets, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 301, 317 n.77 (2009).
179. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 148 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (2006)).
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Silvers & Slavkin,
supra note 178, at 317 n. 77.
181. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
182. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Silvers & Slavkin,
supra note 178, at 317 n.77.
180.
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1934: The National Housing Act 183 (established the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure
deposits of savings and loans; also established the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), which provided mortgage
insurance to protect private lenders from losses associated with
foreclosures on insured mortgages); 184
1989: The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act 185 (reformed, recapitalized, and consolidated
the Federal deposit insurance system; enhanced the regulatory
and enforcement powers of regulatory agencies responsible for
Federal financial institutions; established the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS); FDIC absorbed FSLIC; Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB) replaced FHLBB);186
2000: The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 187
(established principles-based structure for regulating futures
exchanges and derivates clearing organizations; clarified that
some off-exchange trading would be permitted and remain
largely unregulated); 188 and
2002: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 189 (improved accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities
laws; established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB).190
The regulatory history, of course, does not take into account either
the history of deregulation of the financial market or the extent of
183. National Housing Act, ch. 847,48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
184. U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Silvers & Slavkin,
supra note 178, at 316 n.76; id. at 319.
185. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, & 31
U.S.c.).
186. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, pmbl., 103
Stat. 183; id. § 101, 103 Stat. at 187; id. § 401(a)(I), 103 Stat. at 354, § 401(e)(I), 103
Stat. at 356; id. § 702(a)(2A)(a)(I), 103 Stat. at 413.
187. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
A-365 app. E (codified as amended in scattered sections of7, 11, 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
188. U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of2000, sec. 108, § 3 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2006)).
189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.).
190. U.S. GOy'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
pmbl.; id. § 10 1(codified at 15 U.S.C. 7211 (2006)).
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federal and state agency involvement in that market. A similarly
brief history of deregulation would read like this: In 1980, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Ad 91
was enacted, which preempted state imposed interest rate caps. 192
Then, in 1982, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Act,193 which
allowed thrifts to expand beyond mortgage lending into commercial
lending, credit cards, and real estate investing,194 and the Alternative
Mortgage Transactions Parity Act,195 which relaxed restrictions on
lenders' ability to offer adjustable rate mortgages. l96 In 1996, the
National Securities Markets Improvement Ace 97 preempted most
state oversight of nationally traded securities. 198 Finally, in 1999,
Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,199 which repealed the
Glass-Steagall Act and eliminated restrictions on banks, securities
firms, and insurance companies from affiliating with each other. 200
Ironically, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is the piece of federal
legislation that enabled Citicorp to merge with Travelers Group in
1998 to form Citigroup.201 In other words, Citigroup, the parent
company of CitiMortgage, exists only because the laws of the United
States allowed it to spring into existence in 1998. Citigroup itself is
therefore a state-created legal construct, just like the markets in
which it actively participates.
As for the extent of federal and state agency involvement in the
regulation of the financial market, suffice it to say that every financial
institution has a primary federal regulator and a secondary state
regulator. For example, national banks are primarily regulated on the

191. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.s.c.).
192. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 178, at 320.
193. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
194. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 178, at 320.
195. Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1545 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-05 (2006».
196. Silvers & Slavkin, supra note 178, at 321.
197. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
198. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig.l; National Securities
Markets Improvement Act, pmbl., § 102.
199. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
200. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 175, at 7 fig. I ; Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, pmbl.
201. See Lissa Lamkin Broome & Jerry W. Markham, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: An
Overview, I (2001), available at http://www.symtrex.comJpdfdocs/glb---'paper.pdf.
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federal side by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currencl02 and,
in California, by the Department of Financial Institutions. 203 The
point of noting agency involvement is not to catalogue the specific
regulations issued by the federal and state regulators listed but rather
to further undermine the modem contract law assumption that the
market is self-regulating and largely outside of state control.
As the brief histories of regulation, deregulation, and agency
involvement in the financial market demonstrate, a market is
inseparable from the laws that create it. Consequently, the modern
contract law assumption that markets are self-regulating and largely
outside of state control is simply untenable.
2.

Contracts Are Not Voluntary

One of the hallmarks of contract law is the notion that contracts
are voluntary.204 This notion of voluntariness is what ostensibly
separates contracts from other areas of "public" law, like tortS. 205
Contracts, however, are not voluntary in any way that matters.
The Legal Realists argued persuasively that contracts were not the
product of voluntary assent between two private parties, but were
instead the result of coercion. 206 To the Realists, coercion was
ubiquitous and "at the heart of every bargain.,,207 This was because

202.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency "charters, regulates, and supervises all
national banks." About the acc, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/missionlindex-about.html (last visited
Nov. 26, 2011).
203. According to its website, the California Department of Financial Institutions is the
state regulator responsible for overseeing "California's state-chartered financial
institutions."
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
http://www.dfi.ca.gov (last visited August 30, 2011). As such, DFI is "responsible for
administering state laws regulating: banks, credit unions, industrial banks, trust
companies, offices of foreign banks, money transmitters, issuers of travelers checks
and payment instruments/money orders, and premium finance companies." Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 59 (discussing the modem contract law
assumption that contracts are voluntary).
205. See supra note 51 (discussing the public part of the public-private distinction).
206. See generally Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 470; Hale, Duress, supra note 141,
at 606. There is, of course, more recent scholarship on coercion. See, e.g., PIERRE
BORDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY (Chris Tumer trans. 2005). A
more thorough and nuanced analysis of coercion in contract law is, therefore, possible
but beyond the scope of this article. I plan to undertake this analysis in another paper
currently entitled, Contracts, Coercion & The American Dream.
207. Elizabeth Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 764
(1981) [hereinafter Mensch, Ideology].
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mutual coercion exists in every contrace08 for the simple reason that
each party is entitled by law to withhold from the other his capital,
labor, money, or anything else that he owns. 209 Coercion, therefore,
is a function of ownership, which, in tum, is a function of legal
entitlements because it was and is the state that creates and protects
property rights. 21O Not surprisingly, the more one party owns (in
terms of quantity or value), the more potent that party's threat to
withhold becomes.2l1 Accordingly, coercion exists whenever a party
assents to a contract to avoid the consequences with which the other
threatens him.212 Robert Hale explained this idea in 1943:
In the complex bargains made in the course of production,
some parties who deal with the manufacturer surrender a
portion of their property, others their liberty not to work for
him, in order to avoid his threat to withhold his money,
while he, in tum, surrenders some part of the money he now
owns, . .. to avert their threats of withholding from him
their raw materials or their labor. . .. In consenting to enter
into any bargain, each party yields to the threats of the
other. 213

208. Mutual coercion literally encompasses the idea that each party to a contract coerces
the other. See, e.g., Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 474 (discussing how
customers and workers can weaken the owner's coercive power, in the case of
customers, "through their law-given power to withhold access to their cash, the
laborers through their actual power . . . to withhold their services"); Edwin W.
Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 741-42
(1943) (discussing refusal to give consideration unless the promisor makes a return
promise); Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604, 606, 626 (discussing other examples
of mutual coercion). For more recent work acknowledging that mutual coercion
exists in every contract, see Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 163-65.
209. See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 141; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145;
Mensch, Ideology supra note 207, at 764; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 486.
210. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 47174; Mensch, History, supra note 35, at 34-35; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 48788.
211. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-13; Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 47173; Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 627; Mensch, Ideology supra note 207, at 764;
Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 486. The more one party owns has other important
implications beyond just making that party's threat to withhold more potent. See
supra text accompanying notes 146-52 (discussing bargaining power and how much
one is allowed to acquire).
212. See, e.g., Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604,606.
213. Id. at 606; see also Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12 ("If ... somebody ...
wants to use [property] which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the
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Thus, in the context of the home mortgage loan between
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith, Mary Smith surrendered a portion of
her property (i.e., property rights in the house she purchased via the
mortgage and in her money when she agreed to repay the principal
plus interest) to avoid CitiMortgage's threat to withhold the money
she needed to purchase the house.
Similarly, CitiMortgage
surrendered some of the money it owned to avert Mary Smith's threat
of withholding from it some of her property rights.
The sine qua non of coercion is simply that a threat induces the
parties to enter the contract. 214 Such threats exist in the hypothetical
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith loan transaction. Thus, in this way, the
home mortgage loan (i.e., the contract) between Mary Smith and
CitiMortgage is coerced.
A distinction can be drawn between the contract (i.e., the home
mortgage loan) and Mary Smith's decision to purchase a house. It
would be easy enough to limit the coercion argument to just the
contract, since the basic point of this section is that all contracts are
coerced, not voluntary. The fact that Mary Smith could have rented a
place to live, rather than bought one, however, might seem to
undercut the coercion argument being made here. The specific
objection goes like this: Mary Smith could have chosen to rent a
house, rather than buy one, which therefore shows that her decision
to purchase her home was not coerced. In other words, because
another option existed for Ms. Smith (i.e., to rent), she could not have
been coerced into the choice she made to buy her house. This
objection, however, is misplaced.
To begin with, coercion does not require an absence of choice.215
That is, the existence of choice does not disprove the existence of
coercion, because the essence of the latter is that it requires a party to
extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers
on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I want.").
214. See, e.g., Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604,606.
215. See Dawson, supra note 101, at 266--67 (arguing that the courts in various types of
duress situations were confused and misguided in thinking that volition had to be
overcome before duress could be found). Dawson wrote that "courts had been slow to
realize that the instances of more extreme pressure were precisely those in which the
consent [(i.e., the existence of choice),] was more real; the more unpleasant the
alternative, the more real the consent to a course which would avoid it." Prof
Patterson specifically asks whether "compulsion negate[s] 'freedom of consent' and
thus negate[s] consent," and answers the question in the negative. Patterson, supra
note 208, at 741. He states that, "[e]ven non-permissible pressure ... does not negate
consent." Jd. 742. For additional material discussing this point, see Hale, Duress,
supra note 141, at 606.
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choose the lesser of two evils. 216 A person will therefore choose to
enter into a particular transaction to avoid the threat of something
worse. 217
Perhaps more importantly, the fact that someone exercised a
choice does not indicate a lack of compulsion.2\8 This is because a
person's freedom to decline to enter into a particular transaction is
circumscribed by the way society, at least in the United States, has
been set up.219 Society is premised on property rights,220 which are
bestowed by the state. 221 Property rights are not bestowed equally.222
One cannot use an owner's property without the owner's consene23
because the state will enforce the owner's right to keep other people's
hands off of his things.224 So if a person owns enough property or the
right kind of property so that she has a place to live, for example,
then she does not have to worry about finding shelter. 225 She can
provide it for herself. If, however, a person does not own the right
kind of property, she has to get an owner's consent to use his
property. 226 And an owner will not give his consent unless he is

216. Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 618 (discussing Justice Holmes's opinion in Union
Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918)).
217. ld at 605--06.
218. Jd. at 606.
219. Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 470; Hale, Duress, supra note 141.
220. See generally Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 11-14.
221. Jd.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 148-52,208-13. Recall also that one's property
rights determines one's bargaining power in the market and, therefore, the amount one
will ultimately be allowed to acquire. See supra text accompanying notes 148-52.
223. Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12 ("If then somebody else wants to use
[property] which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the extent that
these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a
power, limited but real, to make him do what I want."); Hale, Coercion, supra note
145, at 471 ("What is the government doing when it 'protects a property right'?
Passively, it is abstaining from interference with the owner when he deals with the
thing owned; actively, it is forcing the non-owner to desist from handling it, unless the
owner consents.").
224. See Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604 ("The owner of the shoes or the food or any
other product can insist on other people keeping their hands off his products. Should
he so insist, the government will back him up with force."). See generally Cohen,
Property, supra note 141, at 11-14.
225. Of course, more is at stake with property ownership than merely not having to worry
about housing. According to Morris Cohen, "[i]n a regime where [property] is the
principal source of obtaining a livelihood, he who has the legal right over the
[property] receives homage and service from those who wish to [make use of] it."
Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12.
226. ld.
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paid.227 Consequently, without property of one's own and absent an
owner's consent, a person will have to go without whatever it is, in
this instance, a place to live. Hence, in reality, one's "choice" to pay
an owner for use of his property is really an effort to avoid the threat
of something worse, which is the essence of coercion-having to
choose the lesser of two evils.228
In the context of the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical,
Mary Smith had to decide whether to purchase a home. Her decision
really came down to a decision to go without shelter (and be
homeless), submit to the threat of some other owner (either to rent or
buy the other owner's property),229 or submit to the threat of the
owner whose house she was interested in. It seems pretty clear that
the consequences of being homeless are much worse than the
consequences of paying an owner to use his property, otherwise
people would not pay owners for a place to live. 230 Thus, if Mary
Smith had chosen to rent rather than be homeless, her decision to rent
would have been coerced-she chose the lesser of two evils to avoid
the threat of being homeless.
In deciding whether to rent or buy a home, Mary Smith was
essentially confronted with a choice of threats-pay an owner what
he wants for his property or go without a place to live. But either
way, Smith was confronted with a threat. The only question is which
option (renting or buying) presents the lesser evil? Given that home

227. Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 604 ("Any person, in order to live, must induce some
of the owners of things which he needs, to permit him to use them. The owner has no
legal obligation to grant the permission. But if offered enough money he will
probably do so; for he, too, must obtain the permission of other owners to make use of
their goods, and for this purpose he too needs money . . . . "); see also Cohen,
Property, supra note 141, at 13.
228. Hale, Duress, supra note 141, at 618 (discussing Justice Holmes's opinion in Union
Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918».
229. Threats exist in this other context for the same reason that there was mutual coercion
and, therefore, mutual threats in the context of the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith home
mortgage loan. If Mary Smith had to deal and ultimately contract with another owner
for a place to rent or buy, that owner would essentially be threatening to withhold his
property unless Mary Smith paid him what he wanted for its use. See supra text
accompanying notes 208-26 (discussing the mutual coercion in the CitiMortgageMary Smith loan).
230. See Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 472 ("[T]he consequence of abstaining from a
particular bag of peanuts would be, either to go without such nutriment altogether ...
, or to conform to the terms of some other owner. Presumably at least one of these
consequences would be as bad as the loss of the five cents [for the bag of peanuts], or
the purchaser would not buy .... ").
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ownership is set up to be the more attractive option,231 the choice
representing the lesser of the two evils is the decision to buy. Mary
Smith's decision to buy her home, therefore, was itself coerced.
Consequently, the fact that Ms. Smith chose to buy a home does
not in any way eliminate the coercion that exists in her home
mortgage contract with CitiMortgage. Instead, it demonstrates that
context matters, contracts are not entered into in a vacuum, and
coercion is broad and pervasive in contracts. 232
But just because coercion is involved in the making of every
contract is not to say that there is a problem with every contract or
even that every contract is in need of a remedy. 233 It is to say,

231.

For example, homeownership is one of the primary ways to build personal wealth
through the equity that accumulates in property over time, which, in turn, enables the
homeowner to fund education and other things. See, e.g., Dana L. Kaersvang, Book
Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners Insurance, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1993, 1994 (2006); Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New
Millennium: Transforming Poverty in America, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'y 383, 391 (2002). Homeowners also enjoy tax incentives not available to
renters. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(3) (2006) (permitting deduction for home mortgage
and home equity interest payments); I.R.C. § I 64(a)(I) (permitting deduction for state
and local real property taxes); Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to
Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives to Encourage Homeownership Among
Renters, 44 HARV. 1. ON LEGIS. 97, 106 (2007) (discussing specific tax benefits
enjoyed by homeowners vis-a-vis renters); Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban
Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. Ky. L. REv.
157, 157-58 (2005) (noting that tax benefits are available to homeowners, not
renters).
232. I am very mindful of the potential risk involved in claiming that every contract is
coerced, namely, that this may lead to trivialization of the phenomenon (as simply a
fact of life) instead of a more serious consideration of it. Part of the problem stems
from the negative connotation associated with the term "coercion." See Hale,
Coercion, supra note 145, at 474-75. I also recognize that coercion occurs on a
spectrum, with the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical representing a more
coercive situation than, say, a person stopping to buy a candy bar at a convenience
store on a road trip. See infra text accompanying notes 337-54 (discussing the candy
bar hypothetical). I am certainly not trying to trivialize coercion in contracting by
claiming that all contracts are coerced. I am, however, making a very pointed
argument that contracts are not voluntary in ways that matter. More than this, I am
also suggesting a possible paradigm shift away from a view of contracts as a voluntary
transaction to one premised on coercion. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contracts, Coercion
& The American Dream (working paper) (on file with author).
233. Hale, Coercion, supra note 145, at 471 ("[T]o call an act coercive is not by any means
to condemn it."); id at 474-78 (discussing the nature of coercion); Patterson, supra
note 208, at 742 ("[A] line must be drawn, not between pressure and no pressure, but
between permissible and non-permissible pressure."); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. a (1981) ("[Implied] threats are an accepted part
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however, that contracts are not voluntary, notwithstanding modem
contract law's claim to the contrary.
3.

Contracts Are Public, Not Private

According to modem contract law, contracts are private?34 But
here again, modern contract law is mistaken. Contracts are public for
two related reasons.
First, contract law does not enforce every promise a person makes.
It only enforces some of them. 235 Through its courts, legislatures, and
agencies, the state determines which contracts will be enforced. 236
This determination necessarily requires courts and legislatures to
make policy choices between competing principles and values, such
as freedom and security.237 These policy choices are matters of
public concern. Here, the state (through its contract law and
regulation, or lack of regulation, of the residential housing market)
has made a public policy choice that subprime loans, like the one
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith in the hypothetical, are
enforceable. 238 Once it is acknowledged that the decision about

234.
235.

236.
237.

238.

of the bargaining process. A threat does not amount to duress unless it is so improper
as to amount to an abuse of that process.").
See supra text accompanying notes 51, 56.
Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 485. Once
the state (through its judges and legislators) determines which contracts are
enforceable, the state will then enforce those state created contract rights by literally
putting the sovereign power of the state in the service of one contracting party against
the other. It accomplishes this by compelling one of the parties (through its judges,
sheriffs, and other state agents) to either payor perform.
Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 485. See generally Cohen, Contract, supra note 32,
at 562, 585-92.
See Feinman, Critical, supra note 58, at 841--42; Mensch, Ideology, supra note 207, at
759; Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 484-85. See generally Cohen, Contracts,
supra note 32.
See Phillips v. Mortg. E1ec. Registration Sys., No. 1:09-CV-OI028-0WW-SMS, 2009
WL 3233865, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2009) (granting lender's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice); Rangel v. DHI Mortg. Co., No. CV F 09-1035
LJO GSA, 2009 WL 2190210, at *1, *3--4, *12 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2009) (granting
lender's motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint with prejudice); City of Cleveland v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc. 621 F. Supp. 2d 513,530-31 (N.D. Ohio 2009), affd,
615 F.3d 496, 505-07 (6th Cir. 2010) ("There [was] no question that the subprime
lending that occurred in Cleveland was conduct which 'the law sanctions,' and as
such, it [could not] be a public nuisance."); Rogers v. Am. Brokers Conduit, No. 2:09CV-715 TS, 2009 WL 3584323, at *3 (D. Utah Oct. 26, 2009) (granting lender's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint). The plaintiffs' complaints in all three cases
included, among other things, claims for suitability, negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good
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contract enforceability comes down to a policy choice, nothing
separates private law from public politics.239
Second, specifically because the subprime loan in the hypothetical
is legally enforceable, the state (through its judges, sheriffs, and other
state agents) will step in to enforce the obligations contained in that
contract by compelling Mary Smith, the borrower, to either pay to get
out of it, perform it, or file bankruptcy as a result of it. 240 Thus,
because the state decides whether a given type of contract is

faith, unfair lending practices, and wrongful foreclosure. See generally STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Predatory Lending Practices:
Staff Analysis of Regulators' Responses, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 228, 230-31
(2000) (specifically noting distinction between illegitimate predatory lending
practices, and legitimate and legal subprime lending).
239. All law is politics is, of course, one of the main critiques leveled by the Critical Legal
Studies movement against law in general. In brief, CLS scholars argued that all law is
politics, because the discourses of law and politics are essentially the same. Cf
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE LJ. 1,60 (1984) [hereinafter Singer, Player]. That is, every argument that can
be made in the legislative arena can be, and usually is, also made in court. See, e.g.,
Robert Mangaberia Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv.
561, 565 (1983). Law, therefore, is really just an elaborate political ideology.
Feinman, Critical, supra note 58, at 852. A good example of the "all law is politics"
point is the different treatment given surrogacy contracts in different states. Compare,
e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2011) (prohibiting surrogate parenting
contracts), and Itskov v. N.Y. Fertility Inst., Inc., 813 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (holding surrogate parenting agreement unenforceable as against public
policy), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2011) (surrogate contracts
enforceable), and J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007) (holding gestationalsurrogacy contract did not violate public policy of Ohio and was enforceable).
240. See Cohen, Contract, supra note 32, at 585-86; Singer, Realism. supra note 35, at
483. Ms. Smith could lack the financial resources to payor perform her contract with
CitiMortgage or to file bankruptcy to discharge her obligations under it. In that case,
Ms. Smith would simply have to wait for CitiMortgage to declare a default and sue to
foreclose on the mortgage. CitiMortgage would also sue for any deficiency resulting
from the foreclosure sale of Ms. Smith's house. This deficiency judgment would then
enable CitiMortgage to garnish some of Ms. Smith's wages and seize any other assets
Ms. Smith might own now or in the future, until the deficiency judgment is paid in
full. In essence, if Ms. Smith ends up doing nothing, because she lacks the financial
resources to act, she will end up being forced to pay to get out of her contract with
CitiMortgage. One could also argue that Ms. Smith would be forced to perform her
contract, because her performance obligation to CitiMortgage consists of paying the
amounts specified in the contract. In either event, and specifically because she
entered into a binding contract with CitiMortgage, the state would end up forcing Ms.
Smith to either pay to get out of her contract or perform it.
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enforceable 241 and will actually enforce those contracts, contracts are
public, not private.

4.

The State's Role is Neither Neutral Nor Minimal and, Therefore,
Contracts Are Not Just Between Two Private Parties

As previously shown, the state constructs the market. 242
Notwithstanding this evidence, one of the biggest myths that the
modem contract law system adheres to is that the role of the state is
neutral and minimal. 243 The state's role is neither because, in
addition to fabricating the market, the state also determines
everyone's legal entitlements in the form of property rights, which
then directly impact each person's ability to contract,244 and
ultimately decides which contracts will be enforceable. 245 Clearly,
therefore, the state plays an active role in every contract, and, as a
result, its role is neither neutral nor minimal. 246 Indeed, and as shown
by the state's active role in the subprime loan contract between
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith, it is impossible to say that contracts
are just between private parties?47 The state is as much a party to
each contract as the contracting parties themselves.
5.

Individuals Do Not Act Rationally in the Marketplace, Nor Are
Contracts the Product of Informed Choice

To understand the critique of modem contract law's rational-actor
assumption,248 one must first know something about a "rational
actor." A basic version of the rational actor looks like this: A person
acts rationally where she perfectly processes available information
about alternative courses of action and then ranks the possible
outcomes in the order of expected utility. 249 Expected utility is
241.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See, e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948) (holding that when courts
enforce racially restrictive covenants in real property contracts, they are engaged in
state action, that is, using state power).
See supra Part II.A.I.
See supra text accompanying note 63.
See supra text accompanying notes 146-53,200-05.
See supra Part ILA.3.
See Singer, Realism, supra note 35, at 482; Cohen, Property, supra note 141, at 12.
This is, of course, yet another assumption of modem contract law that cannot be
sustained. See supra text accompanying note 56 (laying out the assumption).
See supra text accompanying note 58.
Game theory ultimately led to a series of "decisionmaking principles or axioms that
rational actors were expected to honor." Hanson & Kysar, supra note 113, at 64l.
According to Hanson & Kysar, "[t]he ultimate conclusion to be derived from these
axioms of decisionmaking is that players will act in the manner that maximizes their
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usually defined in tenns of the person's "self-interest."25o Selfinterest, in turn, is commonly assumed to be wealth-maximization. 251
So, modern contract law's rational actor will end up ranking all of the
possible outcomes, based on all the infonnation provided her, in the
order in which they maximize her wealth. To be a rational actor
therefore presupposes that one will not only have access to the
infonnation relevant to one's decision but will also be able to
understand it and make effective use of it. 252 Unfortunately, none of
this is true in general and not when it comes, more particularly, to
contracts. 253

250.

251.

252.
253.

expected utility." Id. at 642. "Rational behavior," as a result, soon became
synonymous with expected utility. Id.
The economists' model, in its purest form, is based on elegantly
simple propositions about both cognitive capacities and
motivations. The model assumes that a person can perfectly
process available information about alternative courses of action,
and can rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility. The
model also assumes that an actor will choose the course of action
that will maximize expected utility ....
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989); see
also Hadfield, supra note 56, at 1254; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2000) (noting that "expected utility
theory" is the most dominant conception of rational choice theory in modem
microeconomics); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes
on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'y REV. 973,
977 (2000); Willis, supra note 26, at 741.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 249, at 1064 (discussing a "thicker" version of the
rational actor theory in which the actor's own goals and preferences are added to
"expected utility theory's predictions about the manner in which actors will attempt to
achieve their utility"; according to the authors, the most common assumption is "that
actors will seek to maximize what is in their self-interest"); Willis, supra note 26, at
741 ("The thicker versions of rational choice theory would add that consumers'
marketplace decisions reflect their own financial self-interest.").
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 249, at 1066 ("The thickest conceptions of rational
choice theory provide ... more specific predictions about the ends of decision makers
than does the self-interest version. The most common of these very thick conceptions
is 'wealth maximization': the prediction that actors will attempt to maximize their
financial well-being or monetary situation. "); Rostain, supra note 249, at 977.
See Willis, supra note 26, at 741-42.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 705 ("[MJandated disclosure rests on
false assumptions: that people want to make all the consequential decisions about their
lives, and that they want to do so by assembling all the relevant information,
reviewing all possible outcomes, reviewing all their relevant values, and deciding
which choice best promotes their preferences.").
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Studies show, for example, that common form-contract language
is understandable only by people with college degrees/ 54 a group that
does not comprise many contracting parties,255 particularly
consumers. 256 In addition, basic microeconomics continues to
confirm that market failures in the form of information asymmetries
remain fairly common/ 57 obtaining information imposes costS/ 58 and
parties do not have equal access to information. 259
Of course, even if parties did have equal access to information,
behavioral law and economics tells us that individuals do not
consider all of the "salient" information,260 where salience can be
defined as prominent information that individuals actually pay
attention to in making their rational contractual decisions. 261 What

254. ld. at 712 ("[D]isclosures are chronically hard to read. Financial-privacy notices are
written, on average, at a third- or fourth-year college reading level.").
255. According to Ben-Shahar & Schneider, "over 40 million adults are functionally
illiterate, 'and another 50 million have marginal literacy skills.'" Jd. at 711 (quoting
Ad Hoc Comm. On Health Literacy for the Council Council on Scientific Affairs,
Am. Med. Ass'n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281
JAMA 552, 552 (1999)). Significantly, "[r]ates of innumeracy are even worse than
rates of illiteracy." ld. at 712.
256. See id. at 712 ("[O]nly 3% to 4% of the population can understand the language in
which contracts are drafted."); Garvin, supra note 114, at 310-11 & n.62 (discussing
the different studies).
257. Rubin, supra note 114, at 1909-10 (noting that market failure in the form of
information asymmetry occurs fairly frequently).
258. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 13; Garvin, supra note 114, at 308
("As Herbert Simon has observed, both information and its assimilation are costly, so
we must make decisions based on incomplete information."); Rubin, supra note 114,
at 1910 ("Even if the consumer is entirely rational, the opportunity cost of
obtaining ... information may exceed the advantage of doing so, which means that
there is no way for the consumer to remedy the asymmetry efficiently.").
259. See, e.g., KAPLOw & SHAVELL, supra note 113, at 36 ("It is a commonplace that
consumer information is often imperfect .... ").
260. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking & the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending 19-20 (Loyola Law Sch., L.A., Working Paper No.2, 2005)
("[M]ost people use only four or five salient decision attributes in making complex
decisions; beyond that number, decisionrnaking [sic] quality goes down. When under
stress, people reduce the number of attributes under consideration even more
radically, to fewer attributes.") (footnote omitted).
261. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1206 (2003). Cj Whitford, Disclosure,
supra note 102, at 424 ("In a rough layman's sense, it might be said that disclosure
regulation typically pertains to a cluster of considerations that need to be weighed in
determining the 'best buy' for one's money.").
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infonnation is salient, therefore, will vary depending on the
contractual context. 262
Behavioral law and economics also tells us that individuals do not
act rationally in the marketplace for many reasons. 263 I will touch on
two. First, people are "boundedly rational," which simply refers to
the fact that human cognitive abilities are limited. 264 What this means
is that human beings end up taking mental short cuts to help them
make reasonably good decisions that provide them with more or less
acceptable results, but results that may not necessarily maximize their
wealth. 265 Second, people's preferences are affected by the context in
which the infonnation is presented. 266 Studies have shown, for
example, that test subjects will change their preferences based solely
on the way in which the options are presented to them. 267 The
obvious result is that the party in position to frame the choice can
alter the decision ultimately made, notwithstanding the test subject's
expected utility or desire for wealth maximization. 268
But what does all of this mean in the context of the hypothetical
subprime loan transaction between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith?
The hypothetical made clear that TILA and RESP A were complied
with, and, therefore, no statutory violation occurred. 269
Practically speaking, this means that CitiMortgage gave Ms. Smith
her initial RESPA disclosures (the good faith estimates) three days
after receiving her loan270 and her final TILA and RESP A disclosures
at loan closing.271 Practically speaking, this also means that Ms.
Smith probably did not read the disclosures, let alone the loan
documents.272 Even if she did read them, she, like most consumers,

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

267.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 261, at 1225-44.
See generally Garvin, supra note 114, at 302-25; Korobkin, supra note 261, at 1206,
1208-16.
See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 83, at 1477.
Garvin, supra note 114, at 308-09; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 249, at 1143.
Rostain, supra note 249, at 978 ("People's preferences ... are shaped by the very
process by which they are elicited."). This is what the behavioral law and economics
literature refers to as "framing effects." ld.
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 113, at 644 (discussing the work and studies of Tversky
and Kahneman); Rostain, supra note 249, at 978 ("[E]xperimental evidence
establishes that preferences depend importantly on how choices are described.").
See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 113, at 685; Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra
note 83, at 1534.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
Willis, supra note 26, at 745.
Jd. at 747.
Cj Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 2 ("Real people don't read standard form
contracts.").
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probably would not have understood them273 because the disclosures
are extremely complicated. 274 And, because she didn't understand
them, Ms. Smith would have been unable to shop for better terms. 275
In addition, the loan documents would have been framed in a way
that downplayed the risks of the loan;276 the only salient piece of
information Ms. Smith probably focused on was the monthly
payment;277 and Ms. Smith probably took mental short cuts to help
her make her decision, like discounting the likelihood that adverse
events, such as an upward adjustment to her adjustable rate mortgage
and prepayment penalties, might occur in the future.278

273. See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 29 ("A recent FTC survey found
that many consumers do not understand, or even identify, key mortgage tenns.")
Willis, supra note 26, at 751-54 (discussing consumers' financial illiteracy); id. at
763-64 (arguing that financial illiteracy is a bigger problem for sUbprime loan
borrowers).
274. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 27-32 (citing a survey by the Center for
American Progress and the Center for Responsible Lending, which found that 38% of
consumers found mortgage loans too complicated to understand, and this finding was
confinned by a 2006 study by the United States Government Accountability Office
and other studies as well); Willis, supra note 26, at 752 ("The disclosures are not
presented in simple enough lay terms and many borrowers ignore the disclosures as
incomprehensible legally mandated gobbledygook."). See generally Bar-Gill, supra
note 16, at 1102-06.
275. See Willis, supra note 26, at 749-54; cf Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 31
("Consumers who lack information about the basic operation of credit products, who
do not understand annual percentage rates, or who do not know that they have been
charged substantial fees, cannot make effective comparisons among products.").
276. See Willis, supra note 26, at 785-88; cf Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 53-54
(noting that mortgage products defer a lot of the loan's actual costs into the future and
the disaggregation offees in mortgage loans).
277. Willis, supra note 26, at 780,788; cf Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 29 (citing
an FTC survey that found that "many consumers do not understand, or even identify,
key mortgage terms").
278. Willis, supra note 26, at 776-79. Indeed, Professor Bar-Gill notes that
[iJmperfectly rational borrowers will not be able to effectively
aggregate multiple price and nonprice dimensions and discern
from them the true total cost of the mortgage product. Inevitably,
these borrowers will focus on a few salient dimensions. If
borrowers cannot process complex, multidimensional contracts
and thus ignore less salient price dimensions, then lenders will
offer complex, multidimensional contracts, shifting much of the
loan's cost to the less salient dimensions.
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1079.
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In short, people simply do not rank their preferences based on
their expected net utility, because they can't.279 In other words,

people do not act rationally in the market in the ways that modem
contract law presupposes that they do. 280 As a result, contracts are
not the product of rational choice, nor are they the product of
informed choice, despite modem contact law's assertions to the
contrary. 28 I
Notwithstanding that the modem contract law system's rational
actor assumption is flawed in theory and practice, it presents yet
another opportunity for modem contract law to show that it is a selflegitimating system. 282 Forced to acknowledge that people do, in
fact, enter into contracts that cannot be explained as exercises of
rationality, modem contract can avoid questioning its assumption of
rationality by attributing all apparent irrationality to lack of available
information. More specifically, the modem contract law system
assumes that people need information to act rationally in making their
contract decisions. 283 At the same time, the system recognizes that
people do not always have access to the information they need.
Therefore, any apparent irrationality can be attributed to a lack of
relevant information. But to the extent that people do not act
rationally because of a lack of relevant information, the situation can
be remedied relatively easily via disclosure statutes. Disclosure
statutes do not actually solve the irrationality problem-in fact they
probably exacerbate it/ 84 but this is not really the point. The point is
that because the information deemed relevant is provided to the
contracting parties in need of it, modem contract law can then assume

279. See Rostain, supra note 249, at 978 ("People reason poorly about risk, tend to jump
too quickly to erroneous conclusions from incomplete information, and are othelWise
poor statisticians. In short, they consistently fail to determine the most efficient
means to achieve their preferences.").
280. See supra text accompanying notes 248-59. That people do not act rationally in the
market in the way modern contract law assumes they do is very different from saying
that people do not act in a boundedly rational way. In fact, the whole point of the
discussion in the text is to show that a boundedly rational actor, which is the type of
market actor that exists in the real world, is not the same beast as modern contract
law's rational actor.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55, 58-59.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 88-101. I need to thank my friend and colleague
Professor Katherine C. Sheehan for helping me work out this argument.
283. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 650 ("[M]andated disclosure ... rests
on a plausible assumption: that when it comes to decisionmaking [sic], more
information is better than less. More information helps people make better decisions,
thus bolstering their autonomy.").
284. See infra Part III.B.
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once again that people will act rationally in the marketplace. Hence,
the rational actor assumption is reaffirmed and thereby relegitimated, which, in tum, leaves the framework for the modem
contract law system intact. An intact framework means that modem
contract law remains justified in binding people to their contracts. Or
so the argument goes.
6.

Parties Do Not Bargain at Arm's Length and They Are Not,
Most Likely, Strangers to One Another

One last modem contract law assumption needs to be examined,
namely that parties to a contract bargain at arm's length and are most
likely strangers to one another. 285
As with all of the other
assumptions, this one is also contestable in theory and practice
because all contracts are relational. 286
One might argue, however, that the subprime loan transaction
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith in the hypothetical is at arm's
length because the parties probably did not spend a lot of time
together before or during the closing of the loan,287 they are not going
to have an ongoing relationship (because the loan was bundled and
sold as a mortgage backed security), and it was probably a one-time
deal. However, rather than being "discrete,,,288 the hypothetical
contract is in fact relational.
To define and understand a relational contract requires an
exploration of the late Professor Ian Macneil's relational contract

285. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 57.
286. Contracts tend to fall along a relational-discrete continuum-some contracts have
more relational elements than others at the other end of the spectrum. See Ian R.
Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REv.
877, 894-96 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Challenges]; Feinman, Relational, supra
note 48, at 739. See generally William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to
Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 546 (1985) [hereinafter Whitford,
Contribution). Notwithstanding this continuum, all contracts are relational because
even the most "discrete" contract contains relational elements. See infra text
accompanying notes 291-321.
287. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 26, at 790 ("Settlement officers typically schedule home
loan closings every thirty minutes ....").
288. See Feinman, Theory, supra note 36, at 1301 ("Some exchanges are relatively
discrete, involving short duration, limited party interactions, and precise measurement
of the value of the objects exchanged."); Whitford, Contribution, supra note 286, at
546 ("[C]ontracts occurring between parties who have little interaction other than the
contract itself tend to fall on the discrete end ofthe relational-discrete continuum.").
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theory. 289
To summarize the argument before explaining its
application here, all contracts are relational because every contract is
embedded in a particular "social matrix,,290 and in a particular social
context. To Macneil, contracts are exchange relations,29I and
exchanges always take place within the complex social relations
created by the society of which they are a part, that is, within its
social matrix. With respect to this fundamental social matrix, he
writes:
Exchange of any importance is impossible outside a society.
Even the purest "discrete" exchange postulates a social
matrix providing at least the following: (1) a means of
communication understandable to both parties; (2) a system
of order so that the parties exchange instead of killing and
stealing; (3) typically, in modem times, a system of money;
and (4) in the case of exchanges promised, an effective
mechanism to enforc,e promises.292
Despite the seemingly discrete attributes of the hypothetical
contract, therefore, CitiMortgage was only able to make the loan to
Mary Smith because the social matrix of American society (i.e., a
common means of communication, a system of money, etc.) made it
possible. The hypothetical subprime loan is therefore relational in
this first, basic sense.
A contract is also relational, however, because of its social
context. More specifically, all contracts are relational because every
contract is rooted in a particular social context. To fully understand a
289. What follows is actually a very limited analysis of relational contract theory.
Professor Macneil spent decades developing, articulating, refining, and advocating his
theory. See generally Macneil, Challenges, supra note 286, at 877. For a more indepth treatment, see IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (\980); Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of

Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Ian Macneil, Relational Contract
Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INST'L &
THEORETICAL ECON. 272 (1987); Ian Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter, Macneil, Values]. Figuring out
what constitutes a relational contract, therefore, would only be a beginning. See
Whitford, Contribution, supra note 286, at 545 (referring to Professor Macneil's
relational contract theory as a "general theory of the social order").

290. Macneil, Values, supra note 289, at 344.
291. Macneil, Challenges, supra note 286, at 878 ("'[C]ontract' means relations among

292.

people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be exchanging in the
future-in other words, exchange relations.").
Id. at 884.

2011]

Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions

55

given contract, therefore, it must be situated within the framework of
the non-discrete relations, what Professor Macneil calls the
"enveloping relations,,,293 that encompass it. This means, at a
minimum, that the social context (i.e., its enveloping relations) must
be understood. 294 But more than that, it means that an effective
analysis of any transaction will require that all significant relational
elements be recognized and considered. 295 Determining what the
social context or enveloping relations are in a given transaction is an
open question,296 but one that will eventually be answered by
"[c]ommon sense and normal practices of building knowledge on the
basis of past experience. ,,297 In general, however, the relevant social
context may be broadly construed.
Macneil uses the example of relatively small increases and
decreases in banana prices in supermarkets to illustrate this last
point.298 He argues first that the "sales of bananas occur in extremely
complicated supermarket-customer relationships,,,299 and he sets out
that relationship in some detai1. 30o The enveloping relations in this
initial discussion are confined to the "supermarket-customer
relationship." But it does not necessarily have to be so limited. He
says:

/d. at 881, 884.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Macneil acknowledges that "where to stop" in deciding which elements of the
enveloping relations should be considered is a question. !d. at 885. His response is to
say that, "[p]robably all that can be said generally about where to stop is that those
enamored with relational contract theory will probably see important connections, and
hence the need for their treatment, where those enamored with discrete analytical
methods will not." Id. at 886 (footnote omitted).
297. Id. at 884-85.
298. Id. at 885.
299. Id.
300. Thus, Professor Macneil says:
The sale of anyone product is part of an integrated web of
sophisticated supermarket management of the sale of all of its
products. In supermarket-consumer relationships, among other
things, goods are competing with each other for limited and
varying display space, limited consumer attention, and
expenditure of limited consumer resources. Elements of these
relationships are of such a nature that even small changes in the
price of a fairly simple product may send vibrations through other
parts of the web, vibrations likely to reverberate back.
Id.
293.
294.
295.
296.
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[B]anana relations are phenomenally complex. Their sale is
entwined in a particularly tangled international marketing
and power structure. It involves monopolistic outfits like
Chiquita International Brand, a variety of conflicting thirdworld interests (Latin American countries, Chiquita and
Chiquita-Iookalike producers vs. small Caribbean island
countries, particularly non-Chiquita-like producers), and
European vs. American foreign policy, to say nothing of
Chiquita as a symbol of American imperialism,
environmentally damaging practices, big money politics,
[and] the global capitalistic market generally .... 301
In short, the relevant social context of a given contract is
potentially vast and wide-ranging and could include, for example,
other significant relationships: domestic and international markets,
domestic and foreign policy, as well as international and domestic
law. Moreover, the complexity of the seemingly simple "banana
relations" detailed in the quote are similar to the relations involving
subprime loans, like the one in the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith
hypothetical.
Thus, the social context for the hypothetical subprime loan could
logically include, among other things, CitiMortgage's relationship
with its parent company, Citigroup; a variety of institutional entities
like credit-rating agencies, insurance companies, investmentmanagement companies (like the now-defunct Merrill Lynch and
Lehman Brothers); hedge funds; the domestic and international
financial and capital markets; conflicting investor interests (state
pension plans, foreign states, and private investors); American and
international financial policy; and big money politics.
Assuming the relevant social context for the subprime loan in the
hypothetical should be more limited, it could still logically include
the following: a network of laws and regulation/de-regulation of the
American financial market that permitted subprime loans to be
marketed and sold302 and allowed the creation and sale of mortgagebacked securities;303 and Ms. Smith's subprime loan was most likely
30l. ld.
302. See supra Part II.A.I.
303. Professor Oren Bar-Gill provides a very brief and basic description of the
securitization process that took place in the subprime loan market. He writes:
During the subprime expansion, origination volume shifted to
mortgage companies with no independent means to fund the
originated loans. These mortgage companies, and increasingly
also depository institutions, sold the loans that they originated to
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bundled with other CitiMortgage originated subprime loans and
either sold or mortgaged as a mortgage-backed security to various
types of investors. 304 The context would also have to take into
account that the security agreements associated with the sale or
mortgage of the mortgage-backed securities would have included a
provision prohibiting modification of individual loans within the
bundle sold or mortgaged to prevent devaluation of the bundle as a
whole, which, of course, would make individual negotiations with
distressed debtors extremely difficult, if not impossible,305 and that
there were conflicting understandings of the lender's obligations,
with the law saying that lenders (i) owe no fiduciary duty to
borrowers;306 (ii) have no duty to disclose whether borrowers actually

Wall Street investment banks that pooled the loans, carved up the
expected cash flows, and converted these cash flows into bonds
that were secured by the mortgages. At the peak of the subprime
expansion, most mortgages were financed through this process of
securitization. As a result, the "owners" of the loans are the
investors who purchased shares in these Mortgage (or Asset)
Backed Securities (MBSs or ABSs).
Bar-Gill, supra note 16, at 1090-91 (footnotes omitted).
304. See id. at 1074-75 n.l ("[A]nalyzing data covering approximately 85 percent of
securitized subprime loans. In 2006, 75 percent of subprime loans were securitized,
and the authors' data set included 1,772,000 subprime loans originated in 2006,
implying a total of 1,772,000 I (0.85 * 0.75) = 2,779,608.") (citing Yuliya Demyanyk
& Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REv. FIN.
STUD. 1848, 1853 & n.6, 1854 tbl. 1 (2009)).
305. See Adam J. Levitin, Purchasing Mortgage-Backed Securities Does Not Give the
Government the Ability to ModifY Mortgages Backing the Securities (2008),
http://www.law.georgetown.eduifacultyllevitinidocumentsIMBSModificationlssues_0
OO.pdf.
306. Oaks Mgmt. Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561,570 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
("[I]t is established that absent special circumstances ... a loan transaction is at armslength [sic] and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and lender.");
Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 283 Cal. Rptr. 53, 55, n.l (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (rejecting breach of fiduciary duty claim by borrower and holding instead that
the claim failed as a matter oflaw); Pimetal v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 411 F. Supp.
2d 32, 39 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that lenders owe no fiduciary duty to borrowers).
"The relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-client is not fiduciary
in nature. A commercial lerider is entitled to pursue its own economic interests in a
loan transaction. This right is inconsistent with the obligations of a fiduciary which
require that the fiduciary knowingly agree to subordinate its interests to act on behalf
of and for the benefit of another." Nymark, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 55 n.l (citations
omitted); see also Lawrence v. Bank of Am. 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 542 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) ("[U]nder ordinary circumstances the relationship between a bank and its
depositor is that of debtor-creditor, and is not a fiduciary one .... ").
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qualify for the loans they are sold;307 (iii) have no duty to determine
the borrowers' ability to repay the loan;308 (iv) have no duty to refrain
from making loans to borrowers whom the lenders know cannot
repay the loan;309 and (v) have no duty to give borrowers the best
rates 31O-all of which, of course, contradict the understanding held by
a majority of borrowers. 311
What the discussion of the social matrix and social context
applicable to the home mortgage loan between CitiMortgage and
Mary Smith demonstrates, therefore, is that every contract is
relational. And because every contract is relational, no contract is
bargained-for by strangers in an arm's-length transaction.
A "stranger" is "a person who is unacquainted with or
unaccustomed to something [or] a person who is not a member of the
307. Cross v. Downey Sav. and Loan Ass'n, No. CV_09-317_CAS (SSx), 2009 WL
481482, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (holding that the financial institution had no
duty to disclose to the borrower that he could not qualify for the loan); cf Baylor v.
Jordan, 445 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1984) ("Courts have traditionally viewed the
relationship between a bank and its customer as a creditor-debtor relationship which
does not impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure on the bank."); Nymark, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 56 ("[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower
when the institution's involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of
its conventional role as a mere lender of money."); In re Vincent v. Ameriquest
Mortg. Co. (In reo Vincent), 381 B.R. 564, 574 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (holding that
plaintiff failed to allege facts that would impose a fiduciary duty on defendant (lender)
"to make sure that the loan was suitable based on her circumstances").
308. Renteria V. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 922 (D. Ariz. 2006) ("[T]he world
might well be a better place if lenders had a duty to the borrower to determine the
borrower's ability to repay the loan. No such duty exists. The lender's efforts to
determine the creditworthiness and ability to repay by a borrower are for the lender's
protection, not the borrower's."); Norwich Sav. Soc'y V. Caldrello, No. CV89-512204,
1993 WL 268512, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1993) ("A bank does not have a
duty to investigate a borrower's ability to repay the loan."); Anderson V. Franklin, No.
2:09-cv-l1096, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 742765, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26,2010) ("[T]he
world might well be a better place if lenders had a duty to the borrower to determine
the borrower's ability to repay the loan.").
309. Wagner V. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the
lenders did not owe a duty of care to the borrowers in approving the loan); N. Trust
CO. V. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("The lender
also has no duty to refrain from making a loan if the lender knows or should know
that the borrower cannot repay the loan.").
310. See, e.g., Brazier V. Sec. Pac. Mortg., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (W.D. Wash.
2003) (holding that no law requires a mortgage broker to negotiate for a borrower to
obtain the best rate from the lender).
311. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 32 ("The 2002 Fannie Mae National
Housing Survey found that over half of all African-American and Hispanic borrowers
erroneously believed that lenders are required by law to provide the best possible loan
rates.").
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family, group, community, or the like"; while "arm's length" means
"not closely or intimately connected or associated.,,312 Under
Macneil's relational contract theory, the home mortgage contract
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith is not between strangers or at
arm's length, because a social matrix and a particular social context
tie these parties together. They share, for example, a common
understanding of money, language, and system of order. 313 In
addition, a myriad of customs (e.g., one should be on time for
appointments and pay one's bills), understandings (spoken or
unspoken and legal or not),314 as well as laws and regulations 315 add
integral parts to the relations between the parties. The transaction
between CitiMortgage and Mary Smith, therefore, is "deeply
embedded in a wide range of interconnected relations.,,316
Consequently, and contrary to modem contract law's assumption,317
there simply are no strangers in a given society and an arm's-length
transaction is an oxymoron.
B.

The Universe of Contracts

It should be clear from the discussion in the last part of this article
that all of modem contract law's assumptions are deeply flawed, if
not fallacious. The implications for the efficacy of disclosure statutes
should be apparent, but will be discussed in more detail later. 318 The
broader point to be made, however, is that, because the assumptions
are highly questionable, modem contract law cannot justify holding
parties to their contracts. Yet the contract between CitiMortgage and
Mary Smith is binding-it satisfies contract law's formation
requirements, and given the presumption of contract validity, all of its
terms (reasonable and unreasonable) are likely enforceable between
Consequently, absent the justification that the
the parties. 319
assumptions seemingly provide, continuing to bind Mary Smith and
CitiMortgage to this contract is an unmitigated exercise of state
power. 320
312.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

115, 1880 (2d ed.
1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 289-92 (laying out Macneil's social matrix).
See supra text accompanying notes 289-97.
See supra Part lI.A.l.
Macneil, Values, supra note 289, at 345.
See supra text accompanying note 57.
See infra Part III.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-83.
See supra note 138.
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
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But the existence and use of this unmitigated state power within
the modern contract law system is not confined to the type of contract
exemplified by the CitiMortgage-Mary Smith contract. In other
words, it is not confined to a bad bargain procured through the
improper use of unequal bargaining power.
Rather, this
unadulterated use of state power extends to all contracts formed
within the modern contract law system. 321
In response to the claim that all contracts are made binding as an
exercise of state power, one could argue that the critique of modern
contract law articulated in this article covers too much. This is
because some contracts "work"-both sides get what they want from
the deal and walk away once the contract has been completely
executed. Contracts that "work" in this manner ostensibly pose no
problem, and, therefore, to the extent that the analysis includes these
contracts in the critique, the critique is overbroad. It is not, for the
reasons elaborated below.
Contracts can be formed in circumstances of unequal bargaining
power or not, where bargaining power is defined 322 to include
anything-resources (money, time, staff), experience, expertise,
knowledge, etc.-that gives one party a bargaining advantage over
the other party.323 The terms of contracts can also be "fair" or not.
Fairness in terms, however, is much harder to conceptualize, for the
simple reason that "fair" does not lend itself to easy explanation or
definition.
Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines "fair" as
"[i]mpartial; just; equitable; disinterested[;]... [f]ree of bias or
321. I need to thank my friend, Professor Nancy Kim, for bringing this issue to my
attention.
322. BARN HIZER, Bargaining Power, supra note 94, at 92 ("A party has bargaining power
if she has the ability to effect intelligently a preferred outcome in a bargaining
relationship. ").
323. Some scholars appear to distinguish party sophistication from bargaining power. See
generally Miller, supra note 54, at 495-96. The distinction turns on the definition of a
"sophisticated party." See generally id. at 494-95 ("For its ubiquity, party
sophistication remains an unstudied and largely unaddressed question in contract law.
Although they often mention sophistication, the extensive contract treatises of
Williston, Corbin and Farnsworth do not dedicate a section to clarifying what is meant
by the terminology. This article begins the discussion."). I think it is entirely possible
that the sophistication of the contracting parties is at least an element of bargaining
power, if not just bargaining power under another name. In other words, the more
sophisticated a party is, especially vis-a-vis its contracting partner, the more likely it is
that the sophisticated party will be able to procure a contract that favors its interests.
If this admittedly oversimplified analysis is correct, then it seems to me that "party
sophistication" becomes just another way to say that one party has superior bargaining
power.

2011]

Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions

61

prejudice. ,,324 To some economists, fairness suggests that "some
legal opportunities for gain are not exploited.,,325 To non-economists,
fairness is a way to incorporate other-regarding preferences. 326 To
political philosophers like John Rawls, fair terms are ones that a
citizen might reasonably offer and which the citizens to whom such
terms are offered might also reasonably accept. 327 Implicit in Rawls's
use of "reasonably" twice in his conception of fair terms is the
understanding that the citizens he refers to are "free and equal, and
not ... dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior
political or social position.,,328
Hence, fair terms seem to presuppose either the absence of
superior bargaining power or the existence of superior bargaining
power that is not used to exploit gain. To achieve such a result would
thus seem to require implementation of a version of Rawls's veil of
ignorance.329 That is, the terms of the contract would have to be
determined in a situation where the parties did not know their own
bargaining power and, therefore, which side of the bargaining table
they would end up on (the strong or weak side).
In theory, the idea of bargaining through a veil of ignorance to
achieve objectively fair contract terms is very appealing and should
be explored further. 330 But it is unclear how workable a solution this
will be because unequal bargaining power is a fact of life and
expecting market actors to go against their economic self-interest to
the extent necessary to produce such terms seems unrealistic. That
said, some contracts are objectively better than others. A "bad
bargain," for example, is one in which the terms unreasonably favor
one party.331 With this understanding of a bad bargain as a baseline, a
contract on fair terms would be a contract in which there is a mix of
terms favorable to each party such that the terms do not unreasonably
favor one of the contracting parties. The pivotal point is the point
where the terms become unreasonably favorable to one of the parties,
and, at that tipping point, that particular contract would be deemed

324.
325.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S286 (1986).
326. Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Perils of Forgetting Fairness, 59
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 597, 606 (2009).
327. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xliv (1996).

328. ld.
329. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999).
330. See Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 159.
331. Hart, supra note 5, at 179 n.14.
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unfair. In other words, a bad bargain would represent a contract on
"unfair" terms. 332
Notwithstanding that contracts can vary with respect to these two
factors-with some having fair terms, and some resulting from no
inequality of bargaining power-all of them are still subject to the
critique made in this article, because all of them have something else
in common. Specifically, regardless of whether the terms are fair or
whether any inequality of bargaining power exists in formation, a
contract is likely to be found to be valid and enforceable under
modem contract law. This is because the presumption of contract
validity springs into existence upon formation (via mutual assent and
consideration),333 and, for reasons discussed earlier, it is extremely
difficult to overcome this presumption. 334 The presumption of
contract validity plus enforcement means that all contracts are likely
to be binding under modem contract law, including but not limited to
ones that are both unfair and the product of abuse of bargaining
power,m arguably like the home mortgage loan between
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith.
Modem contract law does not justify contracts that have fair terms
or were created with no inequality of bargaining power by pointing to
their fairness or the lack of inequality. Rather, as discussed earlier,
modem contract law makes contracts binding because of the
assumptions the system makes about the parties, the market, and the
role of the state. 336 All of these assumptions are ostensibly at work
regardless of whether a contract was formed under circumstances of
unequal bargaining power or has resulted in unfair terms. A brief
hypothetical will illustrate this central point.
Assume that a man on a road trip to a place he has never been
before walks into a convenience store, selects a candy bar from the
shelf, and then takes it to the store clerk (whom he has never met),
who rings up the sale. After paying the clerk, the man leaves the
store and eats his candy bar. Despite the fact that no words were
spoken, a contract for the sale of the candy bar was formed. 337
332. For purposes of this argument, it need only be assumed that a line can be drawn
between fair and unfair; it is not necessary to decide where that line would be.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
337. See U.c.c. § 2-204(1) (2003) ("A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement, including ... conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of [such] a contract .... "); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) ("A promise may be stated in words either oral or written,
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All of modem contract law's assumptions are ostensibly at work
in making this simple contract binding. 338 Specifically, one could
argue that the sale represents a private, arm's-length transaction
between private parties who were literally strangers to one another.
The man's choice of the candy bar was voluntary, presumably
infonned, and the product of rational choice. The self-regulating
market worked just fine and without state interference, having only
set the price of the candy bar. And the state's role with respect to the
entire transaction was neutral and minimal. But just as with the
subprime mortgage loan contract between CitiMortgage and Mary
Smith, all of the assumptions are dubious in the context of this simple
contract as well and for the same reasons.
To begin with, the market for the sale of a candy bar would be
unrecognizable without the web of laws implicated in constructing
the market for the sale of food, like a candy bar. This would include,
but certainly not be limited to, laws governing food labeling,339
manufacturing and safety regulations/ 40 as well as extensive
involvement by agencies such as the United States Department of
Agriculture34I and the Federal Food and Drug Administration. 342
Consequently, the market for the sale of a candy bar is inseparable
from the laws that create the market. The candy bar market is,
therefore, not self-regulating or largely outside of state control.
Nor is the contract for the candy bar voluntary, as it was procured
through mutual coercion,343 specifically, with the clerk implicitly
saying, "payor I withhold the candy bar," and the man implicitly
responding, "give me the candy bar or I withhold my money." The

338.
339.
340.

341.
342.
343.

or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."); id. § 19(1) ("The manifestation
of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or
by failure to act. ").
See generally supra text accompanying notes 55-63 (listing the assumptions).
See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, lOA
Stat. 2353.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2006) (governing food additives); 42 U.S.C. § 242r (2006)
(governing improvement and publication of data on food-related allergic responses);
21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (governing misbranded food); 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2006)
(governing inspection of locations where food is manufactured, processed, packaged
or held).
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portaVusda/ (last
visited Nov. 26, 2011).
See generally, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov (last visited Nov. 26,
2011 ).
See supra text accompanying notes 206-13.
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contract for the candy bar was thus formed to avoid these mutual
threats.
Moreover, the state says that contracts formed by conduct are
valid. 344 The state also says that a sale of goods, like the sale of a
candy bar, is enforceable 345 and would be enforced by the state
through, for example, its shoplifting laws. 346 Hence, because the state
decides whether the contract for the candy bar is enforceable and will
actually enforce this contract/47 the contract for the sale of the candy
bar is public, not private.
The state was actively involved in creating the market for the sale
of the candy bar and ultimately decides whether the contract for the
candy bar is enforceable. For these and other reasons as well,348 it
would be very difficult to say that the state's role in this contract is
neutral or minimal. The state, therefore, is as much a party to the
contract for the sale of the candy bar as the parties to that contract
themselves. Consequently, it is also impossible to say that contracts
are just between private parties.
And while the man choosing a candy bar off of a convenience
store shelf may not have been acting irrationally, there is also nothing
to suggest that he was acting as a rational actor in making his
selection. To satisfy modem contract law's version of the rational
actor, the man choosing the candy bar would have to be able to rank
all of the possible candy bar choices, based on all the information
provided him (from the label of the available candy bars, for
example), in the order in which they maximize his expected utility,
which generally means maximizing his wealth. 349 While it is possible
that some people may act in this fashion, it seems fairly safe to say
that this behavior does not describe how most people purchase candy
bars.35o The contract for the candy bar, therefore, is not the product
of informed or rational choice, at least not in the way that modem
contract law constructs the rational actor.

344. See supra note 337 (cites for contracts formed by conduct).
345. See generally V.e.e. §§ 2-101 to -804 (2011).
346. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.1 (West 2010) (dealing with petty theft where the
value taken is less than fifty dollars and stating that the punishment for petty theft is
by fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars).
347. See supra Part II.A.3.
348. See supra Part ILA.4.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 249-53 (discussing modem contract law's rational
actor).
350. Cj Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 2 ("Apart from an exotic individual here or
there, nobody reads.").

2011]

Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions

65

Finally, the parties did not bargain at arm's length, nor were they
strangers to one another, because of the social matrix351 (i.e., the
parties shared a common language, system of money, etc., that
enabled the sale of the candy bar to take place) and the social
contexf52 within which the sale took place. 353 This context would
include, for example, customs (one should pay for something before
eating it); relational characteristics, like brand loyalty to a particular
kind of candy bar; laws, including, but not limited to, local zoning
laws that made having a convenience store possible in a particular
location, laws pertaining to interstate travel, and Article 2 (sale of
goods) of the Uniform Commercial Code; and regulations (i.e.,
requiring store clerks to wash their hands after using the restroom).
The social matrix and social context applicable to the sale of the
candy bar, therefore, show that this contract is also relational, and not
an arm's-length transaction between strangers.
Thus, since all of the assumptions are deeply flawed and highly
contestable, both theoretically and in practice,354 the argument is that
modem contract law cannot justify making any contracts binding.
Nonetheless, modem contract law in practical application does just
that. Consequently, the inescapable conclusion is that modem
contract law makes all contracts binding as an unmitigated exercise
of state power.
III. CONTRACT LAW AND UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER
The critique so far is not that all contracts produced under the
framework of modem contract law present a problem calling for a
remedy or some other kind of state sponsored interference. In fact,
most contracts produced by the modem contract law system would
not currently require such intervention. Rather, the critique is simply
that all contracts are made binding as an exercise of state power.
Making contracts binding in this fashion, however, ensures that
unequal bargaining power is and will continue to be a systemic and
structural feature of the modem contract law system.

351. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 293-97 (explaining "social context").
353. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92. The social context for the sale of the
candy bar would be fairly analogous to that described in Professor Macneil's example
of the sale of bananas in a supermarket. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying
text.
354. See supra Part II.A (discussing why the six assumptions of modem contract law are
flawed).
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Synergy: State Power and Unequal Bargaining Power

The types of power at work in the modem contract law system can
be distinguished. There is state power, which makes all contracts
binding,355 and there is an individual contracting party's bargaining
power. Continuing to distinguish them in this way is conceptually
useful. But the distinction is also a fiction because individual
bargaining power is power that is ultimately conferred by the state
through property rights. 356 Recall that the state determines property
rights. 357 Property rights, in tum, translate into individual bargaining
power-the more one party owns, the more bargaining power that
party commands and, therefore, the more that party will be able to
dictate contract terms.358 Thus, state power is always implicated and
in many ways instantiated in every contract because it is present in
the modem contract law system in both of these ways. A synergistic
relationship is thereby created, the effect of which is to increase and
reify the bargaining power of the party with more bargaining power.
The synergism works this way: Individual bargaining power
enables the party with more bargaining power (the "stronger party")
to dictate contract terms. Bargaining power is increased via each
contract the stronger party enters into, because the stronger party is
able to reap more gains from each contract than it otherwise would
with less bargaining power. The stronger party's bargaining power is
then reified each time a contract is formed, because contracts formed
via mutual assent and consideration are generally going to be
binding. 359 The premise that contracts are made binding, therefore,
ensures that the stronger party will be able to retain the benefits from
each of its contracts. Consequently, and over time, the stronger party
will end up owning more resources (money, property, labor, capital,
etc.). And then the synergism comes full circle because the more one
party owns, the more bargaining power that party has, and so on.360
B.

Institutionalizing Unequal Bargaining Power

Regardless of its source, unequal bargaining power exists. 361
Unequal bargaining power poses difficulties for modem contract law

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 146-52,210-12.
See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.
See supra text accompanying notes 146-49, 21l.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
See Mensch, Ideology, supra note 207, at 762.
See Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 240.
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when it is used, for example, to obtain a bad bargain. 362 This problem
is very real because modem contract law does not effectively address
unequal bargaining power. First, with the exception of disclosure
statutes, all of modem contract law's remedial mechanisms, like
contract interpretation and defenses to enforcement, are available
only after a contract is formed. 363 Indeed, this structural aspect of
modem contract law is partly what gives rise to the presumption of
contract validity.364 Recall that the presumption essentially makes all
contracts formed via mutual assent and consideration binding,
including contracts procured through an improper use of unequal
bargaining power?65 Second, the tools modem contract law relies
upon to address unequal bargaining power are ineffective. 366
Because unequal bargaining power is not effectively addressed, its
use and abuse within the modem contract law system remains hidden
and, more importantly, unchecked. In this way, modem contract law
institutionalizes unequal bargaining power, which ultimately
redounds to the benefit of the party with more bargaining power.
Disclosure statutes provide an excellent illustration of this argument.
In theory, disclosure statutes are supposed to provide notice to the
weaker contracting party367 about important terms of which she
would probably not otherwise be aware. The weaker contracting
party will therefore have actual knowledge, at least with respect to
the disclosed terms, before expressing her assent to the contract.
Since mutual assent is still a required element of contract
formation/ 68 disclosure statutes are supposed to improve the quality
of the weaker party's mutual assent, by ensuring that the weaker
party's assent was informed. 369
Unfortunately, disclosure statutes are premised on the same
assumptions that make up the framework for modem contract law. 370
As previously discussed in detail, all of these assumptions are
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

367.
368.
369.
370.

See Hart, supra note 5, at 210-15.
See supra notes 75-77 (contract interpretation and defenses to enforcement).
See supra text accompanying notes 69-85.
See supra text accompanying notes 83, 86-87.
See Hart, supra note 5, at 198-218 (discussing in detail why modem contract law's
expanded policing doctrines, namely, unconscionability, economic duress, and
misrepresentation do not effectively address the unequal bargaining power, and,
therefore bad bargain problems).
"Weaker" is used here to refer to the party that does not have access on his own to the
information in the possession of the stronger party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17(1), 22(1)(1981}.
See Ben·Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 649-51.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
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fallacious. 371 As a direct result, disclosure statutes will not work. 372
In fact, empirical studies support this conclusion. 373 They will not
remedy unequal bargaining power in the form of information
asymmetries. 374 Compliance with disclosure statutes, therefore, will
not actually increase the quality of the weaker party's mutual assent.
Instead, compliance with disclosure statutes will produce two adverse
outcomes, both of which serve to strengthen the presumption of
contract validity. 375
The obvious outcome is that compliance with disclosure statutes
will give the appearance that the quality of the weaker party's mutual
assent has increased, when in fact it has not. That is, such
compliance merely improves the image but not the substance of the
resulting contract-it is ostensibly no longer a product of power and
pressure of the stronger party but an act of a better balanced and wellconsidered decision-making process. 376

371. See supra Part II.A.
372. See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 665-729 (documenting the
failure of mandated disclosure and laying out in detail why mandated disclosure does
not work).
373. For example, Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler recently conducted empirical
research to examine the "informed minority" justification for disclosure statutes.
Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 3--4. Her study made two main
findings: (1) increasing contract accessibility did not result in an economically
significant increase in contract readership, id. at 4, 18-26, 30, and (2) the very few
shoppers who actually did read the online end user license agreements (EULAs) were
equally likely to purchase a product regardless of whether the EULA was buyerfriendly. Id. at 4,27-30. As a result, Marotta-Wurgler concluded that the informed
minority justification for disclosure statutes "is simply too weak to make any
difference in this setting," and that "[d]isclosure per se [would] result in little increase
in readership or economic pressure on sellers." Id. at 31. Significantly, MarottaWurgler also notes that, since "search and access costs are so low online ... increased
contract disclosure would seem even more likely to be ineffective in increasing
shopper attention [in] omine contexts as well." Id.; see also Whitford, Disclosure,
supra note 102, at 430-31 (focusing on Truth-in-Lending in an early attempt to assess
whether disclosure statutes are effective in accomplishing their purposes, and
tentatively concluding, both empirically and theoretically, that disclosure statutes
would have little impact); Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 8-9 (citing
prior empirical evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure regimes).
374. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 742--43.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 69-83 (discussing the presumption of contract
validity).
376. Cf Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 3 ("[In the context of the 'opportunity to
read,'] it is now a standard view to confront the unreadness[ -of-contracts] reality with
myths, fictions, and presumptions, all intended to preserve a conceptual apparatus that
fits a world in which transactors know all the terms").
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The more perverse outcome,377 however, is that such compliance
will likely eliminate several contract policing doctrines that would
otherwise be available to challenge the presumption of contract
validity.378 For example, a claim that the implied obligation of good
faith was breached would probably fail because the term was
Assuming compliance with applicable
disclosed up front. 379
disclosure statute(s), a claim or defense based on fraud or
misrepresentation, including misrepresentation in the form of a
material non-disclosure,38o would also likely fail because there would
arguably be no fraudulent or material misrepresentation. 381

377. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 738 ("[M]andated disclosure can
undennine other consumer protections . . . [like] unconscionability . . . ."); cf
Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 12 ("[C]ourts might mistakenly be
led to believe that sellers' tenns are the product of well-functioning market
mechanisms and be more lenient in policing abusive tenns.").
378. There are other contract policing doctrines whose efficacy would be unaffected by any
type of disclosure, like duress and undue influence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 175 (duress), 177 (undue influence) (1981). Unfortunately, these
doctrines will generally be of little help to the individual because they are often
unsuccessful when raised. My theory about why these traditional doctrines, like the
other policing doctrines mentioned, are unsuccessful turns on the fact that (1) all of
these doctrines are available only after the contract is fonned in the first instance; see
supra text accompanying notes 81-82; and, consequently, (2) they are all subject to a
"process problem" that makes successfully raising any of these doctrines in litigation
unlikely. See Rart, supra note 5, at 210-16 (discussing the "process problem" in
detail); supra text accompanying notes 73-90; Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal
for the Contract Doctrine of Duress, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 443, 463-65 (2005)
(concluding, on the basis of an empirical study of duress cases, that because of the
"conflict and confusion" surrounding the elements of duress, only a small fraction of
duress claims are successful); Morant, MLK, supra note 40, at 110 ("The existence of
regulatory devices [like] duress, unconscionability, and undue influence cannot ...
sufficiently accommodate marketplace inequities. The... dearth of cases where
individuals are successful in obtaining relief through those devices substantiates this
point. This result is compounded by the heavy burden of proof placed upon the
claimant of such relief.") (footnotes omitted). Cf Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis
Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1097 (2006) ("Data revealed that in only 37.8% (56 out
of 148) ofthe cases sampled unconscionability was found .... ").
379. See supra note 107 (discussing Robert Summers's interpretation of the good faith
requirement as requiring disclosure). See generally Rouh, supra note 107, at 1027-28
(containing a much more expansive interpretation of good faith).
380. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) (when non-disclosure
is equivalent to an assertion).
381. A contract claim for misrepresentation requires a fraudulent or material
misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). By
definition, a misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or material, presupposes that a
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In all likelihood, an unconscionability82 claim or defense would
probably fail, again because of the disclosure of the term. Under
these circumstances, there is no "unfair surprise" and, therefore,
arguably, no procedural unconscionability. 383 Indeed, the argument
stated more particularly would be that there was compliance with the
disclosure statute and, as a result, there simply can be no procedural
unconscionability.384 The party raising unconscionability either as a
claim or defense usually must prove both procedural and substantive
unconscionability to prevail. 385
In short, compliance with disclosure statutes only serves to
strengthen the presumption of contract validity by making it appear
that the quality of the weaker party's mutual assent has increased and
by ruling out the application of several contract policing doctrines.
By strengthening the presumption of contract validity, these
outcomes (1) simultaneously create systemic incentives for the party
with more bargaining power to impose even more onerous or onesided terms during contract formation; 386 and (2) increase the power
"false" statement is being made. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
Actual compliance with a disclosure statute would preclude a false statement in the
disclosures made. Recall also that there is no duty on the part of a lender, for
example, to disclose whether borrowers actually qualify for the loans they are sold.
See supra text accompanying notes 306-11.
382. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (unconscionable contract or
term); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011) (unconscionable contract or clause).
383. Cf Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of
E-Standard Terms Baclifire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 840, 853 (2006) (making the
same argument regarding unconscionability in the context of on-line contracting).
384. According to U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 67 (2000),
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdfi'treasrpt.pdf, "The fact is that
written disclosure requirements, without other protections, can have the unintended
effect of insulating predatory lenders where fraud or deception may have occurred."
385. See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982); Leff, supra note 108, at 487-88. But see Gillman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824,829 (N.Y. 1998) ("While determinations of unconscionability
are ordinarily based on the court's conclusion that both the procedural and substantive
components are present, there have been exceptional cases where a provision of the
contract is so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of
substantive unconscionability alone.") (citations omitted); State v. Wolowitz, 468
N.Y.S.2d 131, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("While there may be extreme cases where
a contractual term is so outrageous and oppressive as to warrant a finding of
unconscionability irrespective of the contract formation process (see, e.g., Jones v.
Star Credit Corp., 298 N'y.S.2d 264 266-67 (Sup. Ct. 1969», such cases are the
exception. ").
386. This is because any subsequent challenge to the validity of the terms added during
formation will likely fail.
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of that stronger contracting party by effectively immunizing the
exercise of that bargaining power during contract formation from
subsequent challenge (i.e., by eliminating several contract policing
doctrines).387 In the hypothetical subprime loan transaction between
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith,388 for example, it could be argued that
CitiMortgage was incentivized to impose the onerous terms (high
origination and post-origination fees, the prepayment penalty clause,
and high interest rate )389 on Mary Smith because it could do so with
little risk of liability. 390
One could argue in response to the hypothetical in general that
using a subprime mortgage loan is the wrong example. 391 The real
problem is not the subprime loan, but rather that the American
financial market crashed. 392 Both parties-CitiMortgage and Mary
Smith-ended up doing very badly as a result of it. While this

387.
388.
389.
390.

See supra text accompanying notes 366-72. See generally Hart, supra note 5.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
There is low risk of liability to CitiMortgage because of compliance with the
disclosure statutes and the presumption of contract validity.
39l. One could also argue that using a subprime mortgage loan is the wrong example
because it involves a very complex transaction where the inequality of bargaining
power between the parties is stark. As a result, the subprime loan example presents
the "too easy" case, that is, the type of case that would obviously expose flaws in the
modem contract law system. While I agree that a subprime loan contract is extremely
complex, I disagree that it is the wrong example.
The subprime mortgage loan was chosen precisely because it is a problematic
transaction on its face-the unequal bargaining power and unfair terms seem
apparent. This is exactly the type of contract that one would think contract law would
be well equipped to deal with, precisely because it is so obviously problematic. One
of the main points this article tries to drive home, however, is that the modem contract
law system is not set up to deal effectively with this kind of contract even though it is
one that most people would likely agree is troubling. If contract law cannot even deal
effectively with this kind of contract, then the likelihood that it will be able to deal
well with contracts that are not as obviously problematic, but which nevertheless
present issues with which contract law should be concerned, is greatly diminished.
The subprime loan was also chosen because it involves disclosure statutes. Another
main argument made in this article is that disclosure statutes do not work, but they
give the appearance that something is being done to address a specific problem in
contracting. Because something is being done, no further inquiry is made. As a
result, other very real problems get glossed over, specifically, racial and gender bias.
The subprime loan example allows me to make this important point. See infra Part

IlI.e.
392. In fact, this is exactly the argument Professor Victor Goldberg made in response to
my presentation based on this article at the Spring Contracts Conference held at the
William S. Boyd School of Law, at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, in February.
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general statement is correct, it misses the main thrust of this article's
analysis and critique of modem contract law. To see the flaw, one
need only consider the implications of the transaction for both parties
with and without the financial market crash.
Prior to the financial market crash, CitiMortgage sold Mary Smith
a loan that she did not qualify for and on terms that dramatically
increased its profits on the 10an. 393 Absent the financial market crash,
CitiMortgage would have made a lot of money on its contract with
Mary Smith to Mary Smith's detriment. CitiMortgage, therefore, ran
into trouble only because the financial market crashed, not because of
the subprime loan it sold to Mary Smith. 394
Mary Smith, on the other hand, would have still been at the wrong
end of a very bad bargain, regardless of whether the financial market
crashed or not. She was sold a loan she did not qualify for and on
very bad terms, ones that she could not afford. 395 The crux of Mary
Smith's problem, therefore, stems from the subprime loan contract
itsel[.196 This is because the presumption of contract validity springs
into existence immediately upon contract formation, and the burden
of rebutting the presumption is imposed on the weaker contracting
party,397 here, Mary Smith. Given that it is extremely difficult to

393. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30 (laying out the hypothetical).
394. Fonner Citigroup chief executive officer Charles Prince and fonner chainnan of the
board Robert Rubin admitted as much in recent testimony before the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission. Mr. Prince stated, "I'm sorry that our management team,
starting with me, like so many others, could not see the unprecedented market
collapse that lay before us." Mr. Rubin testified in a similar vein when he stated that,
"[a]lmost all of us in the financial system - including financial finns, regulators,
rating agencies, analysts and commentators - missed the powerful combination of
forces at work and the serious possibility of a massive crisis" and, "We all bear
responsibility for not recognizing this, and I deeply regret that." Jim Puzzanghera,
Two Former Top Citigroup Executives Apologize for Crisis and Bailout, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.comlprintl20 10/apr/09Ibusinesslla-fi-citibailout9-20 1Oapr09.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30 (terms of the loan).
396. In fact, regardless of whether the market rose, stayed the same, or crashed, Mary
Smith was sold a mortgage loan on very bad tenns. So even if the market rose and
Ms. Smith was able to refinance her house, she would still be worse off as a result of
her loan with CitiMortgage than she would have been had she not been sold a loan on
such bad terms. The focus on the housing market crash, therefore, is simply
misplaced. The real problem is the unfairness of the subprime loan contract between
CitiMortgage and Mary Smith. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (suggesting
that the high prepayment penalty in Mary Smith's subprime loan could have made it
prohibitively expensive to refinance out of her loan with CitiMortgage at all, let alone
prior to CitiMortgage's upward adjustment of its adjustable rate mortgages).
397. See Hart, supra note 5, at 204---16; supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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overcome the presumption of contract validity in practice,398 any
terms (reasonable or unreasonable) imposed by the party with more
bargaining power (CitiMortgage) during contract formation would
likely be deemed valid and enforceable in any subsequent dispute
between the two contracting parties. 399 The contract, in other words,
would be binding and Mary Smith would be stuck with her very bad
bargain with CitiMortgage, regardless of the financial market crash
and whether CitiMortgage kept the loan itself or sold it to another
entity.
Ironically, instead of protecting the rights of someone like Mary
Smith, the weaker contracting party, compliance with disclosure
statutes will actually undermine them 400 in favor of CitiMortgage, the
party with more bargaining power. Significantly, CitiMortgage's
abuse of its superior bargaininffi power will probably remain hidden
because the process problem4 1 will either prevent a challenge to
these subprime mortgages from going to court in the first instance402
or will cause most of the challenges that do make it through the
courthouse doors to fail. 403 This is at least in part because the already
enormous costs of litigation would be compounded by choice of
forum clauses that would likely require litigation in a foreign state; 404
choice of law clauses usually adopt the law of a non-consumer
friendly state to resolve the dispute;405 and, of course, modern
contract law's solutions, namely, the contract policing and defense to
398.
399.
400.
40 I.
402.

403.
404.
405.

See supra text accompanying notes 72-82. See generally Hart, supra note 5, at 21016.
In fact, it has already been established that subprime loans are enforceable. See supra
text accompanying notes 238-40.
Hillman, supra note 383, at 853-55.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-82.
Mandatory arbitration provisions would also prevent challenges to subprime
mortgages from getting into court. Many, if not most, of the subprime loan contracts
include such provisions. See, e.g., Civil Rights Groups Commend Freddie Mac's
Leadership in Banning Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING (Dec. 9, 2003), http;llwww.responsiblelending.orgimedia-center/pressreleases/archives/groups-commend-freddie-mac-ban-on-mandatory-arbitration.html
("In recent years, the inclusion of mandatory arbitration language in subprime
mortgage contracts has become increasingly common ... , The increasing inclusion of
mandatory arbitration clauses in subprime home loans without the borrower's
knowledge has been especially pernicious, disproportionately affecting seniors, lowincome, African-American and other minority families."); Salley v. Option One
Mortg. Corp., 246 F. App'x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the arbitration clause
in a subprime mortgage contract was not unconscionable).
c.f. Hart, supra note 5, at 214-15.
Hart, supra note 5, at 215 n.218.
Id. n.219.
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performance doctrines, would be ineffective or unavailable in most
cases to resolve the problem. 406 As a result, CitiMortgage's abuse of
its unequal bargaining power would also go unaddressed. Unequal
bargaining power is thereby institutionalized in the modem contract
law system, and, as a consequence, the system effectively permits the
party with more bargaining power (CitiMortgage), if it so chooses, to
impose bad bargains on its contracting partners (e.g., Mary Smith)
with impunity.

406. The contract policing doctrines would be ineffective in most cases to resolve the
unequal bargaining problem because (a) disclosure pursuant to the disclosure statutes
could rule out the application of several contract policing doctrines entirely, see supra
text accompanying notes 365-72 (discussing the policing doctrines potentially
affected); (b) the contract policing doctrines are not generally successful when they
are raised, see DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 378, at 1097 ("Data revealed that in only
37.8% (56 out of 148) of the cases sampled unconscionability was found."); see also
Giesel, supra note 378, at 463-65 (examining published state cases from 1996
through 2003 and finding that in "only nine of the eighty-eight [duress] cases did the
court decide the matter in favor of the duress claim," of those nine cases, an appellate
court affirmed a lower court's finding of duress in only two cases); and (c) the
difficulty in rebutting the presumption of contract validity in practice means that most
cases will likely lose in court, see supra text accompanying notes 73-82 (discussing
the difficulty of rebutting the presumption of contract validity). The defense-toperformance doctrines include impracticability of performance and frustration of
purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265 (1981). It is black
letter contract law that changes in a market do not affect the basic assumption on
which contracts are made. Consequently, the second element of both claims would
fail and Mary Smith would be unable to establish a claim or defense based on either of
these doctrines. Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co. v. Int'! Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112,
1117-18 (6th CiT. 1991) ("While the facts suggest that [International Harvester]
suffered severely from the downturn in the farm equipment market, neither market
shifts nor the financial inability of one of the parties changes the basic assumptions of
the contract such that it may be excused under the doctrine of impracticability. "); In re
F. Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co., 389 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("In
Toebe's litigation with the state, Toebe's claim of impossibility was ostensibly
grounded upon common law principles, under which mere changes in marketing
conditions which render performance unprofitable do not justify releasing a party
from its obligation to perform."); Milligan v. Haggerty, 295 N.W. 560, 563 (Mich.
1941) ("Nor is there merit to defendants' claim that the lessee was released from
performing his contract by reason of the fact that under subsequent market conditions
it became unprofitable for him to manufacture bricks from the clay on the leased
premises."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (1981).
("The continuation of existing market conditions and of the financial situation of the
parties are ordinarily not such assumptions, so that mere market shifts or fmancial
inability do not usually effect discharge under the rule stated in this Section."). The
same would be true for the doctrines of mistake. Pub. Uti!. Dist. No.1 v. Washington
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 705 P.2d 1195, 1203 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) modified, 713
P.2d 1109 (Wash. 1986) ("[S]hifts in market conditions or financial ability do not
justify avoidance under the rules governing mistake.").
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Smoke and Mirrors

Power is ubiquitous; it exists eve~here.407 This is not an
original conclusion. The Legal Realists,408 Critical Legal Studies,409
feminism,41o and more "other-oriented" social justice theories such as
Critical Race Theory411 and Queer Legal Theory412 exposed it. Thus,
it is not at all surprising that power is also present in modem contract
law. What is surprising is that the systemic and structural role state
power plays in contract law is not acknowledged or discussed. 413
This omission is especially surprising given that the modem contract
law system adopts the premise that contracts are made binding as a
cardinal principal, continues to adhere to a framework that is
constructed on assumptions that cannot be sustained,414 and
institutionalizes unequal bargaining power. 415 Constructing the
system in this fashion comes with unacknowledged costs.
Specifically, such a system not only reifies pre-existing distributions
and power imbalances, but also exacerbates and ultimately obscures
them to the ultimate detriment of parties with less bargaining power.
Modem contract's formation rules and disclosure statutes play an
important role in this obfuscatory process.
To begin with, disclosure statutes presuppose that the main
problem confronting contracting parties is bargaininfi inequality in
the form of access to and possession of information. 4 (j In so doing,

407. Barnhizer, inequality, supra note 15, at 142 ("[P]ower is omnipresent in human
relations---every actor has power of some kind and to some degree.").

408. See supra Part II. A. 1-2.
409. See supra note 239 (discussing "all law is politics").
410. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed., Alfred A.
Knopf trans. 1993) (1949); CATHARlNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE (1989).
411. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.REv. 1709 (1993).
412. See, e.g., Francisco Valdez, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law
and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
413. See Barnhizer, Inequality, supra note 15, at 141 ("American contract law rarely

414.
415.
416.

acknowledges power explicitly .... ").
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 720 ("[M]andated disclosure is
fundamentally misconceived because its solution to the problem of choice is
information alone. But people's problems choosing go well beyond ignorance.");
Willis, supra note 26, at 743 ("The disclosure regime admits of some boundedness to
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disclosure statutes obscure other more problematic forms of
bargaining inequality, forms that were clearly present in the
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical and in the subprime
mortgage market in general, such as racial and gender bias. 417
As discussed earlier, use of disclosure statutes may also prevent
many contracts from being successfully challenged based on several
of the modem contract policing doctrines. 418 By obscuring the
existence of other contracting problems and rendering several of the
contract policing doctrines ineffective, therefore, disclosure statutes
help mask the power imbalance embedded in the modem contract law
system. 419
Significantly, disclosure statutes also operate as a safety valve for
the modem contract law system. They show that a problem has been
identified (i.e., bargaining inequalities in the form of information
asymmetries) and, more importantly, that something is being done to
address it. 420 That this something (i.e., disclosure statutes) does not
work very effectively is generally ignored,421 and, quite frankly, is
largely beside the point. 422 The point is that something is being done.
consumer rationality ... but concludes that the main correction the market needs is
informational. "); supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
417. See. e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender & Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 817 (1991) (discussing race and gender bias in
the retail car market); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car
Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 109 (1995)
(confirming the same findings of racial and gender bias in the retail car market);
Hosea H. Harvey, Coercion or Choice in Conspicuous Markets: An Applied Analysis
46 (gathering empirical research documenting racial bias in professional sports
markets (e.g., the NBA» (on file with the author); supra notes 22-23 (citing studies
finding that women of color were disproportionately sold subprime loans).
418. See supra text accompanying notes 377-87.
419. Cf Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 31 ("[A] policy concern ... is
that the mere existence of disclosure regimes might lead courts to believe that market
mechanisms indeed work, and thus to give insufficient attention to the potential for
abusive terms.").
420. In an analogous context, Hillman writes that "disclosure is cheap, substantiates the
claim of consumer assent, and constitutes a symbolic victory for those advocating
greater fairness in e-standard form contracting." Hillman, Boilerplate, supra note
383, at 855.
421. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 682-84 (explaining that there are few
critics of mandatory disclosure); Willis, supra note 26, at 39 ("The optimism of some
academics that a middle ground can be found for disclosures that neither under- nor
over-deter risky but frequently socially desirable behavior is misplaced; the bimodal,
poorly-calibrated behavioral response of most of the population to risk is wellestablished, and no warning will change that.") (footnote omitted).
422. Cf Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 94, at 682 ("[M]andated disclosure looks
effective.").
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Disclosure statutes, therefore, provide a visible but ineffective fix for
very real contracting problems; in so doing, disclosure statutes
diffuse the call or drive for alternative ways, like substantive
regulation or maybe even market-based solutions,423 to address
problems in contracting. 424 The modem contract law system is
therefore able to alleviate pressure on itself by providing a quick fix,
which, in tum, enables the system as a whole to continue unexamined
and unchecked. 425 Hence, disclosure statutes create a very effective
smoke screen for modem contract law. They justify the (ab)use of
power by the party with superior bargaining power both by masking
the power imbalance embedded in the very structure of modem
contract law and diverting critical attention and analysis away from
that structure as a whole.
The end result is that the modem contract law system permits if
not encourages the (mis)use of power by parties with more
bargaining power, which, in tum, serves to reify and exacerbate preexisting distributions and power imbalances. 426 A final look at the
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical will illustrate these last
points.
The (mis)use of power in the hypothetical is easy to spot-in a
context that smacks of race and gender bias,427 CitiMortgage sold
Mary Smith a loan with terms that unreasonably favored it and that
modem contract law will likely enforce. 428 CitiMortgage's superior
bargaining power was thereby increased (even if incrementally)
because it was able to extract more gains from its contract with Mary
Smith than it otherwise would if it either had less bargaining power

423.

See Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note 131, at 21-26 (suggesting rating of contracts and
labeling as possible market mechanisms "to provide some degree of informed-ness").
424. See Hillman, Boilerplate, supra note 383, at 23 ("[O]isclosure . . . may
inadvertently ... forestall other attempts at reform."); Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra note
131, at 6 ("[T]he presumption of assent that accompanies pre-disclosed terms
assuages the need to develop other protections."); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra
note 94, at 740 ("Mandated disclosure may not only undermine other protections, but
also inhibit their development."); Marotta-Wurgler, Disclosure, supra note 112, at 6
(,,[C]ourts might be led to mistakenly believe that sellers' terms are the product of
well-functioning market mechanisms and be more lenient in policing abusive terms.").
425. See supra text accompanying notes 282-84 (discussing the rational actor assumption
and the use of disclosure statutes to re-Iegitimate that assumption).
426. See generally supra Part lILA (discussing the synergism).
427. See supra notes 22-23 (citing studies finding that women of color were
disproportionately sold subprime loans).
428. See generally supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text (discussing the
CitiMortgage-Mary Smith hypothetical and binding contracts).
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or was unable to capitalize on it. Its ability to (ab)use its superior
bargaining power was then reified in its transaction with Mary Smith
because the subprime mortgage loan would most likely be binding.
Because the contract would likely be made binding, CitiMortgage is
able to retain the benefits from its subprime loan with Mary Smith
and all of its other subprime loans. Retention of the gains from its
subprime loans means CitiMortgage ends up owning more resources
(i.e., money in this example) over time, which, in tum, further
increases CitiMortgage's unequal bargaining power. 429
Significantly, modem contract law, particularly its formation
rules, legitimizes this (ab )use of power by CitiMortgage by providing
a veneer of voluntariness. Because a contract is by the modem
contract law system's understanding an act of free will (autonomy)
one must "agree" to be bound. This notion of voluntariness is
underscored by the existence of the disclosure statutes (TILA and
RESPA) because Mary Smith (the party in need of the disclosures)
has been given all the salient information necessary to make an
informed decision about whether to enter into the loan contract with
CitiMortgage.
In fact, however, modem contract's formation rules and disclosure
statutes work together to reinforce (and re-Iegitimate) the modem
contract law assumptions that contracts are a product of voluntary
and informed choice and obfuscate the (ab)use of power actually
taking place. In so doing, modem contract law also reaffirms and relegitimates its assumption that unequal bargaining power exists but
only in an unproblematic way.430 Because the existence, (ab)use and
(mis)use of power within the system is obscured, the modem contract
law system is largely successful in its re-Iegitimation effort.
On the surface, therefore, modem contract law's framework
appears intact-the system once again proves to be self-legitimating.
That system, however, ends up diminishing freedom and liberty.
This result should be deeply troubling for contract scholars and others
who believe that freedom and individualism are best represented in
the freedom of contract ideal.

429. This is because the contract is likely to be made binding, which means it was validly
fonned and is enforceable. It is important to note here that the scheme for this
particular loan transaction is one in which the contract was regulated (TILA and
RESP A) in a way that is supposed to help protect the consumer. Imagine if this was
in an area with no consumer protection regulation.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 91-101.

2011]

Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions

79

CONCLUSION
We could certainly pretend things are different in the world of
contracts. Pretending would actually be quite easy because all we
would have to do is continue to subscribe to the current
understanding of modem contract law. Or we could just continue to
claim that the modem contract law system is efficient or serves
individual autonomy well. Of course, to do any of these things, we
would have to ignore that all of the assumptions underlying the
modem contract law system are deeply flawed in theory and practice.
We would also have to ignore the practical implications, if not actual,
adverse consequences, that modem contract law imposes on
contracting parties, especially those with less bargaining power.
The alternative is to be honest and acknowledge that modem
contract law is premised on power, and, therefore, it is not neutral
and does not produce neutral results, notwithstanding the perpetual
myth that the law should be and do just that. 431 If we adopted this
understanding, we could then acknowledge that contracts are made
binding as an exercise of state power and that, as a direct result,
unequal bargaining power becomes a systemic and structural
component of the system. We would then be able to stop pretending,
for example, that contracts are voluntary, informed, and a product of
rational actor decision-making.
Under this alternative view of modern contract law, most contracts
could and probably would still be binding. But we could, at the very
least, discuss the normative questions about the role of power in the
contract law system-should it be constrained, and if so, how? If
there is agreement that power in contracting should be constrained,
we could then contemplate rules that grapple with power per se rather

431.

Samuel J. Astorino, The Transformation Thesis of Morton 1. Honvitz: Research
Problems and Implications for the Practice ofLiberal Democracy, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 1,
6 (1997) ("Law is neutral, therefore, and nonpolitical, because legal reasoning does
not, and should not, react to external social forces."); Susan S. Kuo, Culture Clash:
Teaching Cultural Defenses in the Criminal Law Classroom, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1297, 1298 (2004) ("By legally parsing facts, they learn to siphon off the emotional
and cultural content-both in the stories themselves and in their reactions to the
stories. The language of the law commands that they do this because of the enduring
belief that the law is neutral and impartial.") (footnote omitted); Adele M. Morrison,
Queering Domestic Violence to "Straighten Out" Criminal Law: What Might Happen
When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law's Conventional Responses to
Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 81, 103 (2003) ("This idea
that the law is neutral, unbiased and equally applied regardless of status or identity
permeates the legal system.").
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than continue to wrestle with legal fictions. For example, we could
seriously consider the viability of a veil of ignorance analysis to
determine fair terms.432 We could consider constructing and adopting
We could contemplate new
a bargaining power analysis. 433
interpretations of existing contract doctrines, like good faith,434 or
think about reviving the late Professor Richard Speidel's proposal to
constrain the use of standard forms involving non-merchants in a
sale-of-goods transaction. 435 Or, more radically, we could consider,
as some have suggested, getting rid of mutual assent entirely.436
Obviously, adopting any such rules would require a rigorous
normative analysis that incorporates more than a mere assessment of
their costs and benefits. 437 Such an analysis is outside the scope of
this particular article. Moreover, it is also clear that any solution
proposed would be subject to the very critiques this article has
leveled at the modern contract law system. 438 That the solutions are
imperfect and subject to critique, however, should not and does not
prevent their consideration or adoption. We live in an imperfect
world in which the uneven distribution of power is a fact of life. We
nevertheless have to move forward in a way that is "consistent with
minimum standards for social and economic relationships in a free
and democratic society.,,439 Perhaps contract law has a role to play in

432.
433.
434.

435.

436.

437.

438.

439.

See Singer, Standards, supra note 142, at 142 (suggesting a veil of ignorance
analysis).
See Bamhizer, inequality, supra note 15, at 223-34 (suggesting a bargaining power
analysis); Miller, supra note 54, at 531-35 (suggesting a sophisticated party analysis).
Houh, supra note 107 (advocating for use by courts of the doctrine of good faith as a
device to eliminate racial subordination); Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR
Agreements' ContractlNo Contract Conundrum With Good Faith, 56 DEPAUL L. REv.
55 (2006) (advocating for the use of the doctrine of good faith to fill in gaps in ADR
agreements).
See Richard E. Speidel, Revising VCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52
HASTINGS L. J. 607, 615 (2001) (suggesting revisions to UCC §§ 2-206, 2-207 such
that "the presence of a standard form or term signaled the risk of unfair surprise,"
which therefore required the party using the standard form or term to get the other
party's express agreement or risk having the terms excluded from the contract).
See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring A New Basis for
Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1829 (2004) (suggesting that a no-retraction
principle replace the doctrine of mutual assent).
Joseph W. Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REv. 899 (2009)
[hereinafter Singer, Normative] (discussing normative argumentation and how
lawyers can defend claims of equality and justice).
See Bamhizer, Bargaining Power, supra note 94, at 147 (2007) ("Because power is
so complex and so dynamic ... bargaining power subdoctrines will always be subject
to criticism of in coherency and indeterminacy."); supra Parts II-III.
Singer, Normative, supra note 437, at 899.
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this discussion.
By acknowledging the existence, role, and
consequences of power in the modern contract law system, therefore,
we at least free ourselves to debate all of these issues and solutions
frankly.
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